The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement by Glover, J. Maria
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2012 
The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement 
J. Maria Glover 
Georgetown University Law Center, jmg338@georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1875 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1958615 
 
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1713 (2012) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1958615
GLOVER-FIN(DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
 
101 
ARTICLES THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT J. MARIA GLOVER* 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally based upon a straightforward 
model of adjudication: Resolve the merits of cases at trial and use pretrial 
procedures to facilitate accurate trial outcomes. Though appealing in principle, this 
model has little relevance today. As is now well known, the endpoint around which 
the Federal Rules were structured—trial—virtually never occurs. Today, the vast 
majority of civil cases terminate in settlement. This Article is the first to argue that 
the current litigation process needs a new regime of civil procedure for the world of 
settlement. 
This Article begins by providing a systemic analysis of why the Federal Rules 
inadequately prevent settlement outcomes from being distorted relative to the 
underlying merits—as defined by reference to substantive law—of a given dispute. It 
then explains how the Federal Rules can actually amplify these distortions. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the well-worn adage that settlement	  occurs	   in	   the	  “shadow	  of	   the	  
law,”	   scholars	   have	   shown	   that	   non-merits factors exert significant influence on 
settlement outcomes. However, these insights have not been considered together and 
combined with a systemic focus on the ways in which the influence of these factors on 
settlement outcomes is actually a product of the basic structural features of the 
Federal	  Rules.	  This	  Article	  takes	  these	  next	  steps	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  “shadow	  of	  the	  
law”	   that	   is	   cast	   on	   settlements	   is	   fading.	   Further,	   this Article discusses a new 
phenomenon in the current litigation environment—namely,	  that	  litigants’	  increased	  
reliance	   on	   prior	   settlements	   as	   “precedent”	   for	   future	   settlement	   decisions	   may	  
move	  settlement	  even	  further	  out	  of	  the	  “shadow	  of	  the	  law”	  and	  into	  the	  “shadow	  of	  
settlement”	  itself. 
This Article then traces these problems to three foundational assumptions 
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all of which have become outmoded 
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in a world of settlement. In rethinking these assumptions, it provides a new 
conceptual account that contextualizes previously isolated procedural reform 
proposals as challenges to these foundational assumptions. It also explains how these 
reform efforts ought to be refined and extended with a specific view toward 
systematically redesigning the basic model and operation of the Federal Rules for a 
world of settlement. Lastly, it sets forth new proposals that seek to reorient current 
rules expressly toward the goal of aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of 
underlying claims. 
What emerges is a new vision of procedure—one in which the application of pretrial 
procedural rules do not merely facilitate trial but are designed to provide litigants 
with guidance regarding the merits of claims and are used to align settlement 
outcomes more meaningfully with the dictates of the substantive law. In describing 
this vision, this Article lays the groundwork for the design of a new Federal Rules of 
Civil Settlement. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 103  I.  LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TRIALS AND THE RISE OF SETTLEMENT ................... 106  II. THE VANISHING SHADOW OF THE LAW AND THE GROWING SHADOW OF SETTLEMENT ................................................................................................ 113 A. The Vanishing Shadow of the Law ................................................. 115 1. Overshadowed Shadows: Pretrial Procedures 
Inadequately Address the Impact of Non-merits 
Factors on Settlement Outcomes ............................................. 115 a. Litigation Costs ...................................................................... 116 b. Informational Imbalances ................................................. 120 c. Variance .................................................................................... 122 2. Faint Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Fail To Provide 
Parties with Robust Merits-Related Guidance for 
Settlement ........................................................................................ 125 a. Pretrial Adjudicative Procedures Generate Limited Merits Guidance ................................................... 126 b. Robust Merits Evaluation Occurs Too Late in the Litigation Process To Influence Settlement Outcomes ................................................................................. 127 c. Pretrial Merits-Screening Procedures Sometimes Fail on Their Own Terms ........................... 128 d. Scarce Trials and Current Pretrial Managerial Judging Practices Do Not Cure These Problems ...... 131 B. Eclipsing the Shadow of the Law: Settlements in the 
Shadow of Settlement ......................................................................... 133  III.  TOWARD THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT ............................. 138 A. Redesigning Procedure for a World of Settlement by 
Reconsidering Core Assumptions of the Federal Rules ........... 139 1. Rethinking the Assumption that Plenary Discovery 
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Aligns Case Outcomes with the Merits ................................... 140 2. Rethinking the Assumption that the Proper Role of 
Pretrial Adjudicative Mechanisms Is Limited to 
Screening Out Meritless Cases .................................................. 143 a. Harnessing Pleading-Stage Procedural Mechanisms To Provide More Robust Merits-Based Guidance ..................................................................... 144 b. Creating Post-Pleading-Stage Mechanisms that Provide Meaningful Merits-Based Guidance ............. 152 3. Rethinking the Assumption that Procedural Rules 
Should Apply Uniformly and Transsubstantively to All 
Cases ................................................................................................... 156 B. A New Vision of Procedures Designed for a World of 
Settlement ............................................................................................... 164 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 166  INTRODUCTION The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), enacted in 1938, were designed to achieve a fundamental goal: to facilitate the resolution of cases on their merits.1 To accomplish that goal, the reformers behind the Federal Rules eschewed technical formalities in favor of a streamlined procedural system, one for which plenary truth-
seeking	   followed	   by	   trial	   was	   the	   “gold	   standard.”2 However, federal 
  1  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1182 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that a basic philosophy of the Federal Rules is to facilitate a 
“determination	   of	   litigation	   on	   the	   merits”);	   see also Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 148 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf	   (“The	   drafters of the Federal Rules objected to fact pleading because it . . . too often cut[] off adjudication on the 
merits.”);	  Jay	  Tidmarsh,	  Pound’s	  Century,	  and	  Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 527 (2006) (stating that one goal of the new procedural rules was “the	   resolution	   of	   cases	   on	   their	  substantive merits”).  2  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, From Conley]; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 1,	   at	   549	   (“[O]ur	  procedural	   system	   is	   structured	   around	   the	  belief	  that a case will be resolved at a culminating, all-issues	   jury	   trial.”).	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   1938	  reformers were aware of settlement as a means of case resolution. See Edson R. Sunderland, 
Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,	   864	   (1933)	   (“[O]ne	   of	   the	  greatest uses of judicial procedure is to bring parties to a point where they will seriously 
discuss	   settlement.”).	   Given	   the	   relative	   simplicity	   of	   cases	   in	   1938,	   however, trials were much more likely to occur and were much shorter than modern trials—the length of which ballooned after the 1960s. See Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 567–68; see also Marc Galanter, 
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 477 (2004). 
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civil cases today are virtually never resolved through trial.3 Rather, settlement has emerged as the dominant endgame. The modern system of litigation today faces the same fundamental problem that vexed the 1938 reformers. As was true then, there is reason to worry that case outcomes—now the product of settlements—correspond to the legal merits of a given dispute4 in only the coarsest of ways.5 Ironically, the disorder afflicting the current system represents a new strain that draws much of its strength from the very set of rules designed in 1938 to cure it. Because the drafters of the Federal Rules placed the mechanisms for robust merits adjudication at the end of the litigation process,6 those mechanisms are largely unavailable to influence settlement outcomes in a world without trials. As a result, the task of ensuring that settlement outcomes reflect the merits has fallen to procedural rules governing the pretrial phases of litigation. However, this is a task for which those rules were not principally designed, and there is reason to believe that it is a task for which they are not particularly well-suited. Indeed, pretrial procedural rules tend not to mitigate, and sometimes amplify, the impact of factors unrelated to case merits on settlement outcomes. Moreover, by design, current pretrial rules are 
generally	   insufficient	  to	   inform	  robustly	  the	  parties’	  understanding	  of	  
  3  See infra Part I.  4  By	   “the	   legal	   merits	   of	   a	   given	   dispute,”	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   application	   of	   underlying	  substantive law to the relevant facts of a case. I do not, however, equate	  “the	  merits”	  of	  a	  dispute with a plenary, unlimited opportunity on the part of litigants to develop their claims through the potentially maximal use of procedural tools—a	  conception	  of	  “the	  merits”	  that	  may more fully encapsulate the scholar Roscoe Pound’s	  view	  of	  a	  decision	  “on	  the	  merits.”	  
See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 401 (1909–1910) 
(“With	  respect	  to	  .	  .	  .	  rules	  of	  procedure,	  we	  should	  make	  nothing	  depend	  upon	  them	  beyond	  securing to each party his substantive rights—a	  fair	  chance	  to	  meet	  his	  adversary’s	  case	  and	  
a	   full	   opportunity	   to	   present	   his	   own.”);	   see also Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving	   Cases	   “On	   the	  
Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407,	   413	   (2010)	   (“It	   is	   the	   guarantee	   of	   a	   full	   opportunity—unfettered by concerns for expense, delay, or advancing certain political interests—that 
defines	  the	  ‘on	  the	  merits’	  principle.”).	  Further,	  there	  is	  of	  course	  an	  inherent	  uncertainty	  in	  litigation. Merits-based guidance would lead not to a single, objective result; instead, such guidance could align a range of potential outcomes more closely with the dictates of governing law.   5  See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1088 
(1984)	   (“The	   problems	   of	   settlement	   are	   not	   tied	   to	   the	   subject	   matter of the suit, but instead stem from factors that are harder to identify, such as the wealth of the parties, the likely post-judgment history of the suit, or the need for an authoritative interpretation of 
law.”).  6  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 891–92 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Regulation of Court Access]	  (“Charles	  Clark . . . chief architect of the 1938 Federal Rules . . . believed that merits screening should take place after	  discovery,	  at	  summary	  judgment	  in	  some	  cases	  and	  at	  trial	  in	  most.”). 
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the merits of a given dispute. As a consequence,	   the	   “shadow	   of	   the	  
law”7 cast upon settlement outcomes is growing faint. To make matters worse, distorted settlement outcomes increasingly influence other settlements, thus propagating the original distortions.8 The world of modern litigation is therefore transforming into one in which bargaining takes place in the shadow of earlier bargains. This Article is the first to examine systematically the maladaptiveness of the Federal Rules to a world of settlement and to call for fundamental reform in light of that maladaptiveness. Part I provides a brief historical account of the Federal Rules and traces the progression from a world in which cases were frequently resolved by trial to a world now dominated by settlement. This Part also notes the transformation of the judicial role over the past few decades from one of adjudication to one of case management and settlement facilitation. Part II explores how pretrial procedural mechanisms, designed 
largely	   as	   “way-stations”	   on	   the	   road	   to	   trial,	   fail	   to	   promote and at times hinder meaningful merits-based settlement terms. Moreover, distorted settlements become magnified by the feedback effects settlements have on future settlement outcomes, foreshadowing a world in which settlements occur less in the shadow of substantive law and more in the shadow of other distorted settlements. Part III traces the source of many of these problems to three foundational assumptions underlying the Federal Rules—assumptions that the world of settlement has undermined. Those assumptions are (1) that a regime of plenary discovery facilitates the alignment of case outcomes with the merits; (2) that the proper role of pretrial adjudicative mechanisms is limited to screening out meritless cases; and (3) that procedural rules should apply the same way to all kinds of 
  7  The	  “shadow	  of	  the	  law”	  phraseology	  was	  first	  introduced	  by	  Robert	  H.	  Mnookin	  and	  Lewis Kornhauser. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Mnookin and Kornhauser use that metaphor to describe a confluence of factors that affect settlement outcomes, including the 
entitlements	   created	   by	   governing	   law,	   parties’	   preferences,	   transaction	   costs,	   parties’	  
attitudes	   toward	   risk,	   and	   strategic	   behavior.	  When	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   “shadow	   of	   the	   law,”	   I	  focus on the extent to which legal entitlements created by governing law (and the application of law to underlying facts) impact negotiated outcomes. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2464 (2004) 
(“The	   conventional	   wisdom	   is	   that	   litigants	   bargain	   toward	   settlement	   in	   the	   shadow	   of	  
expected	   trial	   outcomes.”);	   Ben	   Depoorter,	   Essay,	   Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The 
Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957,	  975	  (2010)	  (“[P]rior	  settlements	  are a benchmark or reference point from which to consider the merits of future, similar 
cases.”).  8  See Depoorter, supra note 7, at 976	   (“[Sixty-five] percent of [surveyed] lawyers 
agreed	  that	  ‘[i]t	  is	  helpful	  to	  refer	  to	  settlements	  in	  similar	  cases	  that	  are	  favorable	  to	  your	  
case	  when	  in	  front	  of	  a	  judge	  in	  settlement	  conferences.’”). 
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cases (uniformity) and to all types of substantive claims (transsubstantivity). Rethinking these assumptions provides the necessary foundation for redesigning a system that better aligns settlement outcomes with the substantive law under which litigation arises.9 In setting forth this framework, Part III also reviews a number of distinct reforms and reform proposals and explains how, in fact, they fit together as parts of a broad and unified reaction to the problems with the Federal Rules identified in Parts II and III. Moreover, once viewed through the lens of this Article, it becomes clear that these proposals ought to be further refined and expanded and that new examples of the sorts of reforms that would break free from these outmoded tenets are needed. This framework is offered for use by scholars, the Rules Advisory Committee, organizations like the Federal Judicial Center, and—when appropriate—Congress as a basis for redesigning the Federal Rules for a world of settlement. What emerges from the challenges to these foundational 
assumptions,	   as	   well	   as	   this	   Article’s	   suggestions	   of	   the	   types	   of	  reforms that would break free from them, is a new vision for a procedural system designed for a world of settlement—in particular, one that would convert what is now a largely detached relationship between pretrial procedure and the substantive merits of a given case into one of interdependence. Accordingly, procedural mechanisms should be harnessed to provide meaningful merits-based information 
to	   guide	   parties’	   settlement	   decisions,	   and	   judicial	   evaluation	   of	   the	  merits through these mechanisms should have operational 
consequences	  for	  determining	  parties’	  access	  to	  additional	  procedures,	  especially those that have a tendency to create settlement distortions. In short, this Article begins to lay the foundation for the redesign of current procedural rules for a world of settlement. I LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TRIALS AND THE RISE OF SETTLEMENT The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, represented a significant departure from both common law and code systems of procedure and embraced instead the more discretionary 
  9  To be clear, this Article works within the existing realities of litigation; although the challenges to the Federal Rules are fundamental, they reflect the world in which we live rather than the world we might ideally want. Thus, I do not suggest that we jettison trials altogether, that parties who wish to go to trial be prevented from doing so, or that the existing Federal Rules fail to align outcomes with the merits in the rare cases that go to trial—questions I defer to future work.  
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and individualized principles that had been used in courts of equity.10 The 1938 reformers sought primarily to eliminate procedural technicalities that prevented cases from being resolved on their merits through the application of substantive law to the facts11 and that stood as an obstacle to justice for ordinary citizens.12 To achieve this goal, the Federal Rules embraced a relatively simple model of adjudication: Cases were to be resolved on their merits at trial (by jury where appropriate)13 following plenary discovery,14 and following pretrial 
  10  See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 11, 12(e), 13, 14, 15, 19(b), 20, 23, 26(b)(1), (c), (d), 35(a), 37(a)(4), (b)(2), 39(b), 41(a)(2), (b), 49, 50(a), (b), 53(b), 54(b), (c), 55(c), 56(c), 59(a)(1), 50(b)(1), 60(b)(6), 61, 62(b), 65(c) (following the tradition of equity courts in providing, either explicitly or implicitly, for judicial discretion, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 29 (1912) (repealed 1938), 
available at http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pdf); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (providing for a single form of action and abolishing multiple forms and procedural distinctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (drawing upon Equity Rule 30 to set forth general rules of pleading, claims for relief, affirmative defenses, and a requirement that pleadings be concise and direct, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 25, 30 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pdf); FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (drawing upon Equity Rule 26 to provide for joinder of claims and remedies, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 26 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pdf); FED. R. CIV. P. 19–22 (drawing upon the joinder provisions found in Equity Rules to provide for broad joinder of parties, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 29, 37 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pdf); FED. R. CIV. P. 26–27 (significantly broadening discovery proceedings found under Equity, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 58 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pdf).  11  See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J.	   67,	   68	   (1927)	   (“A	  procedural penalty can be supported only if it is a material aid in the better administration of justice.”);	  Charles	  E.	  Clark,	  History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 
542	   (1925)	   (“Pleading	   should	   perform the office of only aiding in the enforcement of substantive legal relations.”);	  Charles	  E.	  Clark,	  The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 817 (1924) (describing state code reform efforts to reduce interference of technicalities with 
“equitable	  principles”);	   James	  William	  Moore,	  The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 I.C.C. PRAC. J.	   41,	   42	   (1938)	   (“The	   Federal	   rules . . . epitomize the new objective of all procedure . . . that litigation ought to be settled on the merits and not upon some procedural 
ground.”);	   see also Subrin, supra note	   10,	   at	   986	   (“Proponents of . . . the Federal Rules wanted procedure to step aside so that cases	  could	  more	  easily	  be	  decided	  on	  the	  merits.”).  12  See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 445, 447–48 (1906) (noting that procedural technicalities were creating such contentiousness in civil litigation that ordinary people intensely desired to avoid court).  13  Arthur R. Miller, Are	   the	  Federal	  Courthouse	  Doors	  Closing?	  What’s	  Happened to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 588 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, 
Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?].  14  See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and 
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processes that were designed to facilitate accurate trial outcomes. To be sure, settlement was not foreign to the 1938 reformers.15 And disposition of cases was possible through summary judgment, but summary judgment was meant to be rare, and it was infrequently granted in the years immediately following the adoption of the new Federal Rules.16 Dispositive adjudication, to the extent it occurred, was to come at trial or through directed verdict.17 This model of case resolution dominated in 1938 and prevailed for many years thereafter.18 While the Federal Rules have remained fundamentally unchanged since 1938,19 the litigation landscape in which those Rules operate has changed significantly. As is now well known, federal civil trials—the fulcrum around which the Federal Rules were structured20—are now a rarity.21  
 
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (1978) (noting that the 1938 drafters aimed to increase disclosure to reduce the adversarial nature of trial preparation); Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 188–90 (1958) (noting that the 
1938	   reformers	   sought	   to	   place	   “truth	   ahead	   of	   cleverness	   and	   tactics”	   and	   to	   enable	  
citizens	  “to	  come	  in	  and	  put	  [their]	  claim	  before	  the	  judge”).  15  See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note	   2,	   at	   864	   (“[O]ne	   of	   the	   greatest	   uses	   of	   judicial procedure is to bring parties to a point where they will seriously discuss settlement.”);	  Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 414 (citing the predilections toward settlement held by Edson R. Sunderland, one of the 1938 rule drafters).  16  See Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers To Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern 
Era of Summary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689,	   689	   (1996)	   (“Historically, summary judgment was a rarely used procedural device [and] [t]he standard formulation was that 
summary	   judgment	   should	   be	   denied	   whenever	   there	   was	   the	   ‘slightest	   doubt	   as	   to	   the	  
facts.’”	  (quoting	  Armco	  Steel	  Corp.	  v.	  Realty	  Inv.	  Co.,	  273	  F.2d	  483,	  484 (8th Cir. 1960))).  17  Stephen C. Yeazell, Essay, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 636. In 1938, roughly sixty-three percent of adjudicated terminations of cases terminated in trials and directed verdicts. Id. (citing 1938 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1, 233).  18  Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?, supra note 13, at 588.  19  There have been few major substantive amendments to the Federal Rules since their adoption in 1938. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended in 1983 to require lawyers to certify 
that	   their	   filings	   are	   supported	   by	   fact	   and	   law	   after	   an	   “inquiry	   reasonable	   under	   the	  
circumstances”);	   FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (amended in 1983 to encourage judges to exercise a managerial role during pretrial settlement conferences); FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 (amended in 2006 to clarify that discoverable materials also cover electronic data); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (amended in 1970 to exclude attorney work product from discoverable documents, in 1993 to require disclosure of certain documents at the outset of discovery, and in 2000 to require parties to disclose those documents only if they intended to use them 
“to	  support	  [their]	  claims	  or	  defenses”).  20  See Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?, supra note 13, at 588 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 240 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) and Clark, supra note 14, at 177–80); see also Clark, supra note 14, at 193–95 (describing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an adaptation of old civil procedure rules to the needs of modern courts).  21  See, e.g., Charles A. Brown, Note, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in the District of 
Maryland, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1247, 1252 n.37 (2011) (noting a trial rate of around 1.2% for 
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This	  change	  “is	  not	  a	  mere	  difference	  of	  degree.”22 Various factors have contributed to the decline of trials. The increase in the number of criminal cases and private causes of action23 has caused crowded dockets that create strong incentives for judges to encourage the resolution of cases before trial.24 At the same time, cases have grown in complexity and scope,25 especially in light of modern class action practice,26 often making trial impracticable. In fact, as federal cases 
 civil court filings); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1919,	  1956	  n.184	  (2009)	  (“[T]he	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Office	  of the United States Courts . . . shows . . . current	  [trial]	  levels	  approaching	  1%.”).  22  Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 647 (2011) (citing Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination 
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 
(2004)	  (“[J]udges	  conduct	  trials at only a fraction of the rate that their predecessors did . . . . [This is] a phenomenon that runs counter to the prevailing image of litigation in the United States.”)).  23  See, e.g., David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts: More than Meets 
the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REV.	   1578,	   1580	   (1995)	   (“Federal	   judges	   today	   are	   spending	   a	  disproportionate amount of their time on criminal cases, due to the increase in defendants, 
trials,	   motions,	   hearings,	   and	   sentencings.”);	   see also generally J. Maria Glover, The 
Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1137,	  1148	  (2012)	  (describing	  Congress’s	  increasing departure in the last five decades from reliance upon bureaucratic enforcement in favor of reliance upon ex post private litigation as a basis of American regulatory enforcement).   24  See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t	   Try:	   Civil	   Jury	   Verdicts	   in	   a	   System 
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 59 (1996) [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Don’t	  
Try]	   (noting	   that	   “[w]e	  have	  very	  many	   litigated	  disputes	  per	   judge,	   so	   it	   is	   essential	   that	  
most	  cases	  be	  resolved	  without	  judgment”).	  But see Shari S. Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles 
About Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 638 (citing Galanter, supra note 22, at 500) (rejecting the notion that a scarcity of judicial resources explains the vanished trial). The federal judiciary continues to claim that the growing workload impairs its ability to handle its cases. E.g. id. Despite suggestions that the addition of more judges would usher in a world of increased trials, see, for example, John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?:	  Defining	  the	  Courts’	  
Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements 
Needed To Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 248, it may well be that any room for trials made by the addition of judges would simply be occupied by other cases waiting in the wings. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 554 (1989) (introducing the congestion equilibrium hypothesis).  25  See, e.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York University School	  of	  Law)	  (“The	  federal courts have become a world unimagined in 1938: a battleground for titans of industry to dispute complex claims involving enormous stakes . . . and the situs for aggregate litigation on behalf of large numbers of people and entities pursuing legal 
theories	  and	  invoking	  statutes	  unknown	  in	  the	  1930s.”).  26  See, e.g., Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of 
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2019–20 (1997) (discussing Judge Weinstein’s	  handling	  of	  In	  re	  “Agent	  Orange”	  Product	  Liability	  Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 
1396	  (E.D.N.Y.	  1985),	  a	  complex	  mass	  tort	  case,	  in	  which	  he	  “pressed	  for	  settlement”	  while	  also creating an administrative-like regime to process individual claims); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 (1996) (pointing 
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have become more complex,27 the cost of litigating a case to trial has become prohibitive, or at least undesirable, for many litigants. Further, litigants—particularly repeat player defendants28—have consciously adopted a strategy of avoiding trials to steer clear of juries and to increase predictability of outcomes.29 And many litigants view settlement as permitting more creative resolutions than the zero-sum game of trial.30 Finally,	   the	   federal	   civil	   trial’s	   decline	   was	   probably	  aided by Supreme Court rulings that provide for more robust judicial intervention at various procedural steps prior to trial, including summary judgment,31 class certification,32 the admissibility of expert 
 out that the rise of mass tort settlements occurred	   “outside	   preexisting	   channels	   of	  
control”).  27  Scholars have noted that the prototypical lawsuit for which the 1938 Federal Rules were designed was a relatively simple diversity case, not the often staggeringly complex cases brought in federal court today. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508 (1986) (noting that the prototypical case in the minds of the 1938 drafters was one between	   private	   individuals	   in	   which	   “tortious	  injury or breach of contract was claimed . . .	  and	  monetary	  damages	  were	  sought”).  28  Marc Galanter, Why	  the	  “Haves”	  Come	  out	  Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95,	  97	  (1974)	  (describing	  repeat	  players	  as	  actors	  “who	  are	  engaged	  
in	  many	  similar	  litigations	  over	  time”).  29  See Shari Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 144 
(2003)	  (“The	  general	  theme	  [among	  civil	  jury	  critics]	  is	  that	  a	  group	  of	  laypersons	  cannot	  be	  trusted to find the truth and to administer even-handed	  justice.”);	  Marc	  Galanter,	  Real World 
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996) (noting that critics of the 
tort	   system	   believe	   that	   “[i]rresponsible	   juries,	   biased	   against	   deep-pocket defendants, bestow windfalls on undeserving plaintiffs, particularly arbitrary and capricious damages for pain and suffering and random outsize awards of punitive damages”);	  Marc	   Galanter,	  
The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 208 (1990) 
(“Fear	   of	   juries	   leads	   defendants	   to	   settle	   suits,	   whatever	   their	  merits.”);	  Wendy	   Parker,	  
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 921 
(2006)	  (“Defendants	  fear	  a	  trial,	  with	  its	  unpredictable outcome . . . .”).  30  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2674–75 (1995) (noting 
that	   settlement	   enables	   litigants	   to	   craft	   solutions	   that	   offer	   “greater	   expression	   of	   the	  
variety	  of	  remedial	  possibilities	  in	  a	  postmodern	  world”).  31  In 1986, three decisions of the Supreme Court cemented a shift in the focal point of litigation to the summary judgment stage. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256–57 (1986) (requiring the nonmovant, under the standard governing a directed verdict, to provide affirmative evidence supporting a favorable verdict); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (easing the movant’s	   burden	   by	   allowing	   her	   to	   prevail	   without	  proving the nonexistence of material facts); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (requiring the nonmovant, in the face of a judicial 
determination	   that	   her	   claims	   are	   “implausible,”	   to	   produce	   affirmative	   evidence	   to	   the	  contrary). Together, these three cases formalized the transformation of summary judgment from a relatively unused—and even disfavored—procedure into a powerful resolver of disputes. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 87–89, 95 (1990); Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century 
of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 
906	   (2007)	   (demonstrating	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   invigoration	   of	   the	   summary	  judgment procedure confirmed, rather than started, the trend toward higher levels of 
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evidence,33 and the pleading stage.34 These changes have helped to ensure that the pretrial stage is now the focal point of litigation. While trials have all but disappeared, settlement, though not a completely new development in the world of litigation, has become the dominant mode of civil dispute resolution. Today, most cases terminate in settlement.35 The number is even higher for class actions.36 The rise of settlement was reinforced by a shift in judicial attitudes and approaches toward litigation. In particular, in the 1970s, judges began to adopt a more managerial role over their cases in an attempt to deal with growing dockets and to control costs.37 This 
 judicial intervention at the summary judgment stage).   32  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (holding that in order to certify a class, a court must find that the class has presented a common contention of injury, the validity of which can be resolved in one stroke). A series of recent appellate court decisions have called for more robust judicial scrutiny of merits-related issues at the class certification stage. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring judges to determine whether the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule 23 are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence); In re Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).  33  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–91 (1993) (stating that expert testimony is only admissible if a judge deems it relevant, reliable, and grounded in sound scientific methodology).   34  The Court recently ushered in demands for more robust judicial intervention at the pleading stage of litigation. In two cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly¸ 550 U.S. 544, 561, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Court abandoned the 
longstanding	  “no	  set	  of	   facts”	  pleading	  standard	   from	  Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45–46 
(1957)	  and	  replaced	  it	  with	  one	  that	  requires	  a	  complaint	  to	  “state	  a	  claim	  to	  relief	  that	  is	  
plausible	  on	  its	  face.”  35  See, e.g., Clermont, supra note	  21,	  at	  1953	  (noting	  that	  “the	  settlement	  rate	  is	  high”);	  Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most	   Cases	   Settle”:	   Judicial	   Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (referring to research indicating that, even twenty-five years ago, seventy-eight percent of surveyed cases ended in settlement) (citing Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162–64 (1986)); Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 555 (noting that eighty percent of cases end in 
“settlement,	  arbitration,	  or	  voluntary	  dismissal”).  36  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 2 (2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa1108.pdf/$file/cafa1108.pdf (finding that, among diversity cases, every certified class action in its post–Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) study had terminated in settlement); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453 
(expanding	   federal	   courts’	   jurisdiction	   under	   the	   diversity	   statute	   over	   class	   actions to those in which the total amount in controversy exceeds $5 million). Rarely, but not never, do such settlements follow a trial. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197, 2003 WL 22089938, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2003) (noting	  that	  plaintiffs’	  allegations regarding a global cartel price-fixing vitamins resulted in a $49.5 million jury verdict before trebling, then the parties settled the matter after trial but before judgment was entered).   37  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77	  (1982)	  (“In	  growing numbers, judges . . . are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement 
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managerial	  role	  rapidly	  evolved	  from	  one	  aimed	  at	  the	  “the	  business	  of	  
adjudication”	   to	   one	   aimed	   at	   “the	   business	   of	   settlement.”38 Indeed, available empirical evidence reveals not only that managerial judging facilitates early case disposition,39 but also that it is frequently conducted with that explicit goal in mind.40 Scholars have vigorously debated whether the rise of settlement is desirable. Critics charge that settlement deprives the judicial system of public pronouncements of the law41 and provides a vehicle through which defendants, often with the aid of confidentiality agreements and sealed court records, can conceal harmful practices from the public eye.42 They also assert that managerial judging fails to increase efficiency, and instead produces subjective or even arbitrary outcomes 
 
of	  disputes	  and	  to	  supervise	  case	  preparation.”).  38  Resnik, supra note 27, at 528.   39  See EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 38–39	   (2d	   ed.	   2000)	   (“Summary	   judgment thereby enhances settlement possibilities by eliminating sometimes troublesome and illusory issues from a 
case.”); Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge—Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb? 
An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 113, 132 (2009) (reporting that a majority of California judges surveyed 
believed	  that	  they	  were	  “influential”	  on	  parties’	  decisions	  to	  settle	  “between 41% and 60% 
of	  the	  time”).  40  The	   idea	   of	   the	   judge	   as	   “settlement	   facilitator”	   was	   more	   formally	   cemented	   by	  legislative enactments. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 482 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of early judicial intervention to manage cases and requiring every federal district court to promulgate an expense and delay reduction plan and to conduct annual docket assessments); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743, 758 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)) (encouraging	  judges	  to	  weed	  out	  “frivolous”	  securities	  cases	  early	  in	  the	  litigation).	  This role was further embedded as a result of the 1983 amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Civil	  Procedure	  providing	  that	  “[a]	  settlement	  conference	  is	  appropriate	  at	  any	  time”	  during	  
the	  litigation,	  and	  that	  “settlement	  should	  be	  facilitated	  at	  as	  early	  a	  stage	  of	  the	  litigation	  as	  
possible,”	   as	   settlement	   “obviously	  eases	   crowded	  court	  dockets and results in savings to the litigants	  and	  the	  judicial	  system.”	  FED. R. CIV. P. 16	  advisory	  committee’s	  note. See also Robinson, supra note 39, at 143, 146 (reporting that seventy-five percent of judges surveyed are motivated to settle cases because settlement engenders a sense of 
accomplishment,	  and	  that	  ninety	  percent	  of	  judges	  believe	  settlement	  is	  in	  the	  litigants’	  best	  interests in upwards of sixty percent of their settlement conferences).  41  Fiss, supra note 5, at 1089. More broadly, scholars have also argued that settlement deprives the litigation system of needed clarification of legal norms, David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995), that it prevents the public from learning about legal processes and outcomes, and that it prevents our regulatory system from using litigation to place topics on the public agenda independent of those that governmental institutions might place there, Judith Resnik, 
Courts: In and out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 804–06 (2008).  42  See Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information About 
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 663 (2001) (noting that the details of settlements are usually hidden from the public via sealed court orders and confidentiality agreements); Luban, supra note 41, at 2649 (same). 
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because of its discretionary and non-transparent nature.43 Defenders argue that settlements achieve cost savings to litigants and to the judicial system,44 enable more flexible remedies,45 bring about greater party satisfaction,46 eliminate some of the uncertainties and delays of trial,47 and, in many instances, mean the difference between a deal for injured plaintiffs and no compensation whatsoever, particularly in cases of mass harm.48 Normative disagreements aside, however, scholars agree on one thing: Settlement is here to stay.49 II THE VANISHING SHADOW OF THE LAW AND THE GROWING SHADOW OF SETTLEMENT The aspiration behind the 1938 Rules—that cases be resolved on 
their	   merits,	   and	   in	   a	   “speedy,	   just,	   and	   inexpensive”50 manner—remains laudable. But the affliction that the 1938 reformers sought to 
  43  See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 316–18 (1986) (describing how the unavailability of certain legal safeguards in settlement conferences encourages arbitrary decisions by judges); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old 
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 42 (2003) [hereinafter Molot, An Old 
Judicial Role]	   (“[D]iscretionary management tactics that vary inordinately from judge to 
judge	  may	  threaten	  litigants’	  due	  process	  rights . . . .”);	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Parness,	  Improving Judicial 
Settlement Conferences, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 1893–98	   (2006)	   (comparing	   a	   judge’s	  
limited	  “traditional	  judicial	  role”	  with	  the	  discretionary,	  informal,	  and	  overreaching	  powers	  exercised in a settlement conference); Resnik, supra note 37, at 425–26 (describing a judge 
whose	  decisions	  in	  settlement	  were	  “made	  privately,	  informally,	  off	  the	  record,	  and beyond 
the	  reach	  of	  appellate	  review”).	   
 44  See Galanter & Cahill, supra note	   35,	   at	   1360	   (“It	   seems	   probable	   that	   settlement generally does involve the expenditure of fewer resources than adjudication.”).	  However,	  Galanter and Cahill note that settlement may reduce costs asymmetrically; in other words, some classes of litigants—primarily insurers—may capture a greater share of these cost savings than others. Id. at 1363–64.  45  See Gross & Syverud, Don’t	  Try, supra note	  24,	  at	  7	  (“Compromise . . . is the essence of settlement . . . .”).	    46  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2693 (noting that settlement can be 
“empowering,”	  “participatory,”	  and	  “transformative”	  for	  litigants).   47  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1196–99 (2009) (explaining how settlement in some cases is vastly preferred to the potential delays and uncertainties litigation can introduce).  48  See id. at 1197–98 (noting that, absent settlement, plaintiffs who had been injured by 
Vioxx	  would	  have	  risked	  a	  defense	  verdict,	  “even	  those	  with	  stronger	  claims”).  49  Suzanna M. Meyers, Doing Their Jobs: An Argument for Greater Media Access to 
Settlement Agreements, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 603, 606 (2004); see also, 
e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367,	  376	  (2008)	  (“Most	  [lawsuits],	  and	  particularly	  complex	  cases,	  settle	  anyway,	  and	  
this	  trend	  toward	  settlement	  is	  likely	  to	  increase.”); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy 
in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 329 (2006) (noting that a pilot project creating a settlement database for magistrate judges in Chicago started with the assumption that 
“settlement	   agreements	   are	   here	   to	   stay”);	   Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2664–65 
(referring	  to	  settlement	  as	  “the	  ‘norm’	  for	  our	  system”).  50  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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remedy—case outcomes that do not meaningfully correspond to the merits of the underlying claims51—has re-emerged in a new strain. Current pretrial procedures insufficiently address, and at times amplify, the effect on settlement outcomes of factors like cost imposition, informational asymmetries, and variance (uncertainty of settlement range outcomes). These external factors can have a significant impact on settlement values.52 In addition, I argue, these pretrial procedures, as a matter of design, fail to meaningfully inform 
parties’	  understanding	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  dispute.53 Thus, the shadow 
  51  See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform (pt. 1), 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402 
(1910)	  (“[R]ules	  of	  procedure	  should exist only to secure to all parties a fair opportunity to meet the case against them and a full opportunity to present their own case; and nothing 
should	  depend	  on	  or	  be	  obtainable	  through	  them	  except	  the	  securing	  of	  such	  opportunity.”);	  
see also Tidmarsh, supra note	  1,	  at	  533	  (noting	  that	  one	  appealing	  feature	  of	  Pound’s	  view	  is	  
the	  principle	  of	  resolving	  cases	  “on	  the	  merits”).	  This	  goal	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  one	  of	  
“accuracy.”	  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural 
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65,	   65	   (2010)	   (describing	   “accuracy	   in	   litigation”	   as	   producing	  outcomes that reflect the merits of a dispute). It is important to note, however, that believing in a single correct answer to factual and legal questions is overly simplistic. Tidmarsh, supra note	   4,	   at	   409	   (“[A]	   single	   correct	   answer	   to	   either	   factual	   or	   legal	  questions, or in the application	   of	   the	   latter	   to	   the	   former,	   is	   elusive.”);	   cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 247–50 (2004) (categorizing accuracy from either ex ante or ex post perspective and describing tradeoffs between these two perspectives). Accordingly,	  when	   I	   say	   that	   settlement	   outcomes	   infrequently	   reflect	   “the	  
merits”	   of	   an	   underlying	   dispute,	   I	   do	   not	   suggest that there is one perfect outcome for every case; rather, I argue that merits-based guidance could better narrow a range of possible outcomes in line with the dictates of governing substantive law as applied to fact.   52  These external factors may have a less significant impact on settlements in less complex cases that involve no discovery. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, 
Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 790–92 (1998) (reporting, based on a study from 1978, that around fifty-two percent of cases in federal court involve no discovery, and that discovery incidents track case complexity, number of parties, and amounts at stake). This is particularly true given the costs associated with the discovery process for more complex cases. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal 
but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 892 (2009) (stating that in federal cases involving discovery, discovery constitutes half of all litigation costs, and in the most expensive five percent of cases, ninety percent of litigation costs). The numbers on discovery incidents are likely too low, particularly given the recent explosion of electronic discovery. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The 
Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 572 (2010) (pointing out that most studies on discovery are out of date because they were conducted before the 
“explosion	   of	   electronic	   discovery” over the last decade, which hinders the resolution of even routine cases). And it is important to note that statistics about the incidence of discovery can be misleading: As Judge Frank Easterbrook has argued, the threat of discovery may be as problematic as discovery itself. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,	   637	   (1989)	   (“[T]he	   terms	   of	   settlement	   are	   affected	   the	  most	  
when	  the	  parties	  threaten	  discovery	  (explicitly	  or	  implicitly)	  but	  never	  use	  it.”).  53  To be clear, this Part does not argue that the merits of a dispute do not influence settlement outcomes whatsoever, as has been asserted in the context of securities class actions. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
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that governing substantive law	  casts	  upon	  parties’	  bargains	  is	  growing	  faint. 
Moreover,	   the	  “precedents”	  generated	  in	  a	  world	  of	  settlement—namely, prior settlement outcomes—may distort the existing settlement market even further through feedback effects. Contrary to the conventional account of settlements, characterized as unknown and unknowable, empirical evidence reveals that prior settlement outcomes, which internalize the various distortions mentioned above, now serve as an increasingly important determinant of future settlements. As the shadow of the law is fading, a new shadow is emerging: the shadow of settlement. 
A. The Vanishing Shadow of the Law Conventional wisdom holds that settlement occurs in the shadow of the law54—more specifically, that legal entitlements created by governing substantive law have a decided impact on settlement outcomes. However, this conventional view is increasingly questionable today. As this section traces, the pretrial procedural mechanisms upon which the system of litigation now largely relies for the resolution of disputes tend not to help meaningfully align outcomes with the merits of given cases. 
1. Overshadowed Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Inadequately Address 
the Impact of Non-merits Factors on Settlement Outcomes Settlement outcomes are susceptible to the influence of a number of non-merits factors. Indeed, as law and economics, finance-based, and empirical models of modern litigation have revealed, litigation costs, informational asymmetries, and variance can crowd out the merits of a claim by influencing settlement outcomes.55 Psychological 
 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497,	   524	   (1991)	   (“Because the safety valve of adjudication is not available, the strength of the case on the merits simply drops out of the 
settlement	  calculus.”).	  Alexander’s	  conclusions	  have	  been	  challenged.	  See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How	   the	   Merits	   Matter:	   Directors’	   &	   Officers’	   Insurance	   and	   Securities	  
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757–59 (2009) (suggesting the veracity of Alexander’s	  
claims	   is	   ambiguous	   because	   several	   studies	   “may	   support	   the	   proposition	   that at least 
some	  meritorious	  claims	  settle	  higher	  than	  nonmeritorious	  claims”).  54  Again,	  by	  the	  “shadow	  of	  the	  law,”	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  view	  that	  legal	  entitlements created by governing law (and the application of law to underlying facts) guide negotiated outcomes. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note	  7,	  at	  2464	  (“The	  conventional wisdom is that litigants 
bargain	   toward	   settlement	   in	   the	   shadow	  of	  expected	   trial	  outcomes.”);	  William	   J.	   Stuntz,	  
Plea	   Bargaining	   and	   Criminal	   Law’s	   Disappearing	   Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 
(2004)	  (stating	  that	  the	  settlement	  market	  in	  civil	  cases	  “internalizes	  the	  governing	  law”).  55  See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401–03 (2004) (setting forth the economic model of litigation); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
116 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:nnn 
 
models	   of	   litigation	   show	   that	   litigants’	   cognitive	   biases	   tend	   to	  exacerbate these problems.56 Existing literature on these phenomena is extensive and illuminating. However, the insights of existing litigation models have not been viewed together with a systemic focus on the ways in which the impact of these forces on settlement is inevitable given modern litigation practice under the Federal Rules. Indeed, only by viewing these issues through the lens of the mismatch between the current procedural rules and a world of settlement does it become clear that these issues are in some ways the unsurprising products of rules that were simply designed to do something else. The goal here is thus to accept the central insights about these distortions of settlement outcomes,57 expand upon them, and situate them within a larger narrative about the functioning of the Federal Rules in a world of settlement. By adopting this broader perspective, it is possible to see how these distortions have become engrained in—and indeed are perpetuated by—our system of civil procedure in a world of settlement. a. Litigation Costs Economic models of litigation, as well as recent empirical studies, 
 
Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 13–37 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (describing the economic model in detail). For a discussion of how the threat of costs can overwhelm the merits, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract 
a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 445–46 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Suing Solely], and Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69–72 (1997). For a discussion of how informational asymmetries can affect case outcomes, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 409, 413–14 (1984). And for a presentation of a finance-based model of litigation that focuses on variance as a driver of settlement outcomes, see Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1278 (2006).  56  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2000) (proposing that, in frivolous lawsuits, plaintiffs are 
“psychologically	  inclined	  toward	  trial,”	  and	  defendants	  are	  “psychologically	  inclined	  toward	  
settlement”);	   George	   Loewenstein	   et	   al.,	   Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138–40	   (1993)	   (discussing	   “psychological	   factors	   that	  challenge [the Priest-Klein	   model’s]	   central	   assumptions”);	   Jeffrey	   J.	   Rachlinski,	   Gains, 
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113,	  128	  (1996)	  (“Predicting	  the	  behavior of litigants . . . requires an understanding of whether a party views their decision 
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  gain	  or	  loss.”).	    57  By	   “distortions	   of	   settlement	   outcomes,”	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   phenomenon whereby the operation of procedural rules in a particular case enables or amplifies the influence of non-merits factors on settlement outcomes to such a degree that those factors may overwhelm 
the	  merits	  of	   the	   claim.	  And	  when	   I	   refer	   to	   “distortion	  of	  settlement	   ranges,”	   I	   refer	   to	  a	  shift in those ranges, either higher or lower, to a different set of minimum and maximum values for reasons largely unrelated to the merits of the relevant case. 
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strongly support the conclusion that litigation costs can significantly affect settlement outcomes.58 It is well known that defendants will sometimes pay more prior to trial and plaintiffs will sometimes settle 
for	   less	   than	   is	   called	   for	   by	   the	  merits	   of	   plaintiffs’	   claims	   to	   avoid	  litigation costs.59 Of course, the Federal Rules and their application by the Supreme Court have attempted to take into account the effects of cost imposition on litigation outcomes.60 Moreover, there are obvious reasons to suppose that the optimal litigation cost is not zero.61 Nonetheless, the Federal Rules inadequately direct litigation costs toward the generation of merits-based signals, and therefore in cases litigated under the Federal Rules, litigation costs—or the threat of 
  58  See SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 401–03 (outlining the basic economic model of litigation); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 442, 445 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the effects of litigation costs on the likelihood and terms of settlement). For empirical work reporting that eighty-three percent of responding lawyers agreed that costs, and not the merits of a case, were the deciding factor in settlement decisions, see AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAW. TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, at A-6 (2008), 
available at http://druganddevicelaw.net/ACTL%20Discovery%20Report.pdf.  59  See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (1991) [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Getting to No]	  (“[The]	  plaintiff’s	  minimum	  settlement	  demand	  [equates to] the plaintiff’s	  estimate	  of	   the	  expected	   judgment	  at	  trial,	  minus	   the	  plaintiff’s	  
litigation	  costs.	  Similarly,	  the	  defendant’s	  maximum	  settlement	  offer	  equals	  the	  defendant’s	  estimate of the expected	  judgment	  at	  trial,	  plus	  the	  defendant’s	  litigation	  costs.”	  (emphases	  omitted) (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984))); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 98 
(“[Assuming]	   the	   plaintiff’s	   expected	   value	   of	   going	   to	   trial	   is . . . $725,000 [and] the 
defendant’s	   expected loss is $850,000 . . . [t]he plaintiff would prefer any settlement that provided a payment greater than $725,000 and the defendant would prefer any settlement 
that	  provided	  a	  payment	  less	  than	  $850,000.”);	  Miller,	  From Conley, supra note 2, at 65	  (“It	  is reasonable to assume that litigation cost is a factor that may encourage or induce one or more parties to settle in some cases.”).	    60  For instance, the Supreme Court introduced a new plausibility pleading standard partly out of concern that discovery costs may be incurred asymmetrically by defendants, thus generating undue settlement pressure. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (stating that	  it	  is	  “quite	  likely”	  defendants	  must	  participate	  in	  discovery	  despite	  promises	  of	  deferral from plaintiffs); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (concluding that unnecessary discovery costs will be avoided by requiring sufficient conspiracy allegations). For an economic discussion of litigation as a vehicle to extract settlement through the imposition of costs, see Bebchuk, Suing Solely, supra note 55, at 437–38.   61 For instance, some modicum of discovery costs is needed to compel the disclosure of information that would otherwise remain in the hands of the defendant, see, for example, Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement 
and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 676–77 (2006) [hereinafter Rhee, A 
Price Theory], where the author explains how information disclosure will reduce informational uncertainty and thus lower litigation costs by encouraging earlier settlement, and is justified by the promise of vindicating a potentially meritorious claim. 
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them—have the potential to overshadow the merits as a significant driver of settlement outcomes. For starters, the transformation of pretrial procedures into significant, often terminal, litigation events has substantially increased the absolute costs attendant to those procedures. In some cases, these costs can together exceed the costs of trial.62 All other things equal, the threat of these costs—separate and apart from the merits-based information such costs might generate—can cause parties to revise settlement estimates.63 In some cases, settlement values will be shifted systematically downward (or upward) because under-resourced plaintiffs (or defendants) cannot proceed, or at least credibly threaten to proceed, deep into the litigation process.64 Similar effects can occur in cases involving a one-shot claimant whose stakes in an individual case are asymmetrically low in comparison to those of a defendant willing to expend disproportionate resources to set a low settlement value as precedent for future cases or to cement a reputation for being costly to sue.65 Pretrial procedural rules can also exacerbate the effect of litigation costs to the extent those rules impose such costs asymmetrically, either between the parties or temporally.66 As to who must incur particular costs, all things being equal, the party facing higher costs will settle on terms more favorable to the party facing lower costs. As to when such costs are incurred,67 all things being equal, a party who can defer the bulk of litigation costs until a later stage in the litigation can generally achieve a shift in the settlement range in her favor.68 
  62  See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 533 (2007) (noting that trial is often less expensive than discovery and pretrial motions).  
 63  See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 637 (stating that the threat of discovery costs 
affects	  settlement	  terms	  “most”).	    64  See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 33 (May 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Elizabeth%20Cabraser,%20Uncovering%20Discovery.pdf (noting an assumption by courts 
that	   litigants	  have	   “infinite”	   resources	   and	   arguing	   that	   discovery	   abuse	   is	   “diminish[ing]	  
civil	  litigation	  into	  a	  game	  for	  the	  rich”).  65  See generally Galanter, supra note 28, at 98–100 (describing how repeat players in litigation accrue advantages through reputation building opportunities across multiple suits and through interest and investment in rules governing particular outcomes).   66  Nagareda, supra note 22, at 659.  67  See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1312 (noting that a procedural rule that causes litigation costs to be front-loaded	  will	   reduce	  a	   lawsuit’s	  value	  because a claimant must incur larger expenses before gaining the advantage of the information disclosed at the end of the first stage of the litigation).   68  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Howard F. Chang, The Effect of Offer of Settlement 
Rules on the Terms of Settlement, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 489,	  510	  (1990)	  (“[S]ettlement	  terms . . . 
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Asymmetrical cost imposition is usually most pronounced during the discovery process. In general, access to discovery is granted without limitation once a motion to dismiss is denied, enabling claimants to impose significant, asymmetric production costs on the opposing party.69 Moreover, claims that barely survive a motion to dismiss generally trigger the same discovery entitlements as claims that are more likely to succeed. Accordingly, a claimant will obtain a 
“motion	   to	   dismiss	   premium”	   in	   proportion	   to	   any	   temporal	   or	  absolute asymmetrical cost imposition in the discovery stage.70 The plenary discovery process also enables the imposition of significant asymmetric costs upon plaintiffs.71 Defendants can exploit the broad relevance standard under Rule 26(b) by inundating plaintiffs with information,72 forcing them to drink from a fire hose—as if to say, 
“Be	  careful	  what	  you	  ask	  for.”	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  particularly	  acute	  in	  situations where plaintiffs need discovery the most, because they do 
 
tend	   to	   favor	   the	   party	   with	   lower	   litigation	   costs.”);	   Samuel	   Issacharoff	   &	   George	  Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 768–71 (1995) (describing how asymmetric costs in the discovery process increase the bargaining power of the party imposing those costs).  69  See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 52, at 548 (illustrating the incentives that encourage the imposition of excessive discovery costs); Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 637 (pointing out that even the threat of discovery costs will have a meaningful impact on settlement terms); Moss, supra note	  52,	  at	  909	  (citing	  concerns	  that	  excessive	  discovery	  “induces	  settlement	  by	  
imposing	   high	   costs	   on	   defendants”);	   Doubles	   A.	   Rennie,	  The End of Interrogatories: Why Twombly and Iqbal Should Finally Stop Rule 33 Abuse, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 191 (2011) 
(“[Interrogatories] are highly susceptible to abuse because it is so easy to impose costs on 
an	   adversary	   with	   them.”).	   But see Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998) (arguing that discovery is not a tool of abuse given how rarely it is used and how minor a burden it usually imposes).  70  The Supreme Court was sensitive to the imposition of asymmetric discovery costs on 
defendants	  when	  it	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  “plausibility”	  pleading	  standard in Twombly. 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he	   threat	   of	   discovery	   expense”	   can	   lead	   “cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even	  anemic	  cases	  before	  reaching	  those	  proceedings”).	  However, this indirect regulation of discovery through pleading may do little to cure the imposition of asymmetrical costs. See 
infra Parts II.A.2 and III.A.2 (explaining this risk).  71  See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865,	   1882	   (2002)	   (“[L]iberal	   discovery	   can	   also	   work	   against	   poorer	  litigants [who] can be flooded with discovery requests.”).  72  See Cabraser, supra note 64, at 32 (describing how defendants can use discovery 
procedures,	   “with extremely [sic] effectiveness, as an offensive weapon, not simply a 
defensive	  shield,”	  to	  “financially	  exhaust	  their	  opponents	  in	  the	  initial	  discovery	  stages	  of	  a	  complex case long before ever reaching the point at which discovery of key material information	  becomes	   imminent	  and	   inevitable”).	  Cabraser	  quotes	  one	  defense	  attorney	  as	  
saying	   “[t]he	   aggressive	   posture	   we	   have	   taken	   regarding	   depositions	   and	   discovery	   in	  general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’	  
lawyers,	   particularly	   sole	   practitioners.”	   Id. at 22. Strikingly, that same defense attorney 
went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  “[t]o	  paraphrase	  General	  Patton, the way we won these cases was not by 
spending	  all	  of	  [RJR	  Tobacco’s]’s	  [sic]	  money,	  but	  by	  making	  that	  other son of a bitch spend 
all	  of	  his.”	  Id. 
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not	  know	  enough	  about	  defendants’	  internal	  workings	  or	  documents	  to	  craft narrower requests. Many plaintiffs may simply buckle under the sheer volume of information and the costs of sifting through it. Existing ex post mechanisms	  for	  policing	  “abusive”	  discovery	  practices	  do	  little	  to correct either of these distortions of settlement outcomes.73 As a 
result,	   the	   Federal	   Rules’	   principle	   of	   “liberal”	   discovery	   can	   obscure	  rather than reveal the merits. Finally, the Supreme	  Court’s	  plausibility	  pleading	  standard	  under	  
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, cemented in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, imposes new cost asymmetries against plaintiffs at the pleading stage of litigation. The plausibility test now requires plaintiffs to expend potentially significant additional investigatory resources to formulate allegations simply to get into court.74 Those additional costs typically do not lead to any incremental disclosure of facts by defendants, who need not even deny the truth of those allegations in moving to dismiss.75 The effect on settlement outcomes could well be a systematic 
shift	  downward	   in	   the	  value	  of	  plaintiffs’	   claims	  in	  all	  cases—not just those in which plaintiff might reasonably obtain relevant factual information prior to discovery76—in line with the asymmetrical litigation costs associated with the invigorated motion to dismiss.77 
And	   those	   costs	   may	   not	   be	   trivial,	   given	   defendants’	   increasing	  tendency to file complex, lengthy Twombly motions that exploit 
claimants’	   informational disadvantages.78 Consequently, the costs generated by the new heightened pleading standard could cause distortions in settlement valuations or, worse yet, serve as an outright barrier to entry to the federal courts. b. Informational Imbalances Informational imbalances also can have an impact on settlement values. As early law and economics models recognized, these 
asymmetries	   can	   prevent	   the	   convergence	   of	   the	   parties’	   settlement	  
  73  See supra Part II.A.1.a.  74  See, e.g., Miller, From Conley, supra note 2, at 67–68 (noting the added investigatory requirement at the pleading stage imposed upon claimants by Twombly).  75  See Twombly¸ 550 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Twombly 
complaint	   was	   dismissed	   “without	   so	   much	   as	   requiring	   [defendants]	   to	   file	   an	   answer 
denying	  that	  they	  entered	  into	  any	  agreement”).  76  See infra Part III.A.1.  77  See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55,	   at	   1312	   (finding	   that	   a	   plaintiff’s	   option	   to	  settle or continue with the litigation decreases in value with greater litigation costs, and decreases more rapidly if those costs are front-loaded).  78  See infra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining the problems of selective judicial notice). 
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ranges.79 Although the Federal Rules contain some mechanisms for curing informational asymmetries—specifically rules providing for liberal pleading and discovery—they remain largely insensitive to the 
distortive	   effect	   on	   settlement	   values	   generated	   by	   parties’	   strategic	  exploitation of those imbalances for settlement gain.80 The current discovery rules largely tolerate, and to some degree amplify, strategic incentives to exploit informational imbalances. In a world of complex, high-stakes cases, existing discovery mechanisms provide defendants with opportunities to obscure key facts through voluminous production and through aggressive use of privilege and work product doctrine arguments. Defendants also can delay the production of critical documents and information in order to prolong informational asymmetries (and increase the associated asymmetrical 
temporal	  costs	  discussed	  above).	  The	  Federal	  Rules’	   tendency	  toward	  limited and informal judicial supervision of discovery does little to 
curb	   defendants’	   exploitation	   of	   informational	   asymmetries	   and	  accordingly permits the shift of settlement values downward in response to strategic discovery behavior. In addition, the heightened plausibility pleading requirement for plaintiffs,81 combined with the fact that defendants need not even deny the truth of the allegations at the motion to dismiss stage,82 means that the defendant will enter the next stage of litigation with information about how the claimant is likely to proceed through the litigation and with a corresponding advantage at the bargaining table. More fundamentally, the heightened pleading standard, in combination with informational disadvantages to which plaintiffs may be subject prior to any discovery, creates a risk that plaintiffs will plead too much in an attempt to survive the motion to dismiss and unwittingly plead themselves out of court.83 
  79  Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 404.  80  See generally Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1876–81 (noting that equalizing information	   available	   to	   each	   side	   in	   a	   lawsuit	   can	   help	   generate	   “greater	   equipage	  
equality,”	  which	  “helps	  ensure	  the	  accuracy . . . of adjudicated outcomes”).  81  The	   heightened	   “plausibility”	   pleading	   standard	   was	   introduced	   by	   the	   Supreme	  Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, in which the Court held that a complaint must 
contain	  “enough	  facts to	  state	  a	  claim	  to	  relief	  that	  is	  plausible	  on	  its	  face.”	  550	  U.S.	  544,	  570	  (2007). In introducing this standard, the Court in Twombly rejected the long-standing pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson,	  where	   the	  Court	   held	   that	   “a	   complaint	  should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in	   support	   of	   his	   claim.”	   355	   U.S.	   41,	   45–46 (1957) (emphasis added); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (noting that the Conley standard	  “has earned its 
retirement”	  and	  that	  Conley’s	  “no	  set	  of	  facts”	  language	  “is	  best	  forgotten	  as	  an	  incomplete,	  
negative	  gloss	  on	  an	  accepted	  pleading	  standard”).  82  See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  83  See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., 350 F.3d	  623,	  626	  (7th	  Cir.	  2003)	  (“A	  litigant	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Defendants can also exploit informational imbalances at the pleading stage in Twombly motions. When armed with superior 
information,	  defendants	  are	  well	  equipped	  to	  attack	  the	  “artfulness”	  of	  the relevant pleading, tripping up claimants who may plead facts that, in light of information of which defendants are uniquely aware, the opposing party can make appear implausible or inconsistent. Defendants can also inject selective facts into the plausibility determination by invoking the judicial-notice mechanism to cast doubt 
upon	   the	   plausibility	   of	   plaintiffs’	   claims84 and to make required responsive briefs more costly to produce. This advantage may eliminate or reduce the value of various claims, and can create the precise problem attendant to pleading that the 1938 reformers sought to eliminate—the use of procedural traps, in place of the merits, to dictate outcomes. c. Variance High levels of variance, or unpredictability, in litigation outcomes may also distort settlement values.85 As proponents of recent finance-based models of litigation have pointed out, the pretrial phase of litigation involves numerous sets of decisions, or options, which are part of a multi-stage investment process. These models have demonstrated that the level of variance in the price of a claim at any given decision point in the litigation can significantly affect settlement outcomes.86 In a more or less uncertain litigation environment, variance can emerge, for instance, from the content of the substantive 
 may plead itself out of court by alleging (and thus admitting)	  the	  ingredients	  of	  a	  defense.”).  84  See, e.g.,	  Tellabs,	  Inc.	  v.	  Makor	  Issues	  &	  Rights,	  Ltd.,	  551	  U.S.	  308,	  322	  (2007)	  (“Courts	  must consider . . . other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular . . .	  matters	  of	  which	  a	  court	  may	  take	  judicial	  notice.”);	  see 
also Reply Brief for Appellants at 20 n.10, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-cv-6910).  85  See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 
J.)	  (noting	  the	  concern	  of	  “forcing	  the[]	  defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have 
no	  legal	  liability”);	  Lauren	  N.	  Fromme,	  Unreliable Securities for Retirement Income Security: 
Certifying the ERISA Stock-Drop Loss, 64 VAND. L. REV. 301,	   311	   n.53	   (2010)	   (“The	   ‘high	  
variance’	   associated with class-action litigation stems from the possibility of having one enormous, aggregate verdict, as opposed to seeing losses spread out across multiple 
jurisdictions.”);	  Richard	  A.	  Nagareda,	  Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future 
of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 (2009) (noting that settlement pressure increases along with increases in variance). 
 86  See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1276–78. For additional finance-based models of litigation, see generally Rhee, A Price Theory, supra note 61, where the author constructs a pricing theory for legal disputes, and Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal 
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2007) [hereinafter Rhee, The Effect of Risk], where the author argues that lawsuits should be viewed as assets. 
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law, like a statute containing a treble damages provision; from the option to proceed to a new procedural stage in the litigation, like the option upon a denial of summary judgment to proceed to trial or the option, after culling through materials produced in in a period of discovery, either to gather additional information or not (and possibly then settle); or from the option to proceed through litigation as a certified class.87 High levels of variance in potential outcomes at any given point in litigation can shift settlement values upward,88 because a defendant, the primary bearer of variance-related risk, may choose to offload that risk through a settlement, priced in accordance with some calculation 
of	  expected	  value,	  plus	  an	  offloading	  premium	  in	  plaintiff’s	  favor.89 This effect of variance on settlement values can be further magnified by common cognitive biases: Litigants tend to be risk-averse when faced either with gains of moderate-to-high probability or with losses of low probability; conversely, they tend to be risk-seeking in response to low-probability gains or moderate-to-high-probability losses.90 Judicial interpretations of certain Rules are sensitive to some degree to the possibility that variance can shift settlement values upward for reasons unrelated to the merits. Variance concerns 
underlie	   in	   part	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decisions	   in	   the	   summary	  
  87  See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1317 (tracing how variance can emerge from changes in and use of both substantive and procedural rules).  88  Id. at	  1276.	  This	  effect	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  a	  plaintiff’s	  ability to reduce her litigation expenditures sufficiently in case the lawsuit goes poorly from her perspective. Id. at 1315–16.  89  The paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is the settlement that typically follows the certification of a class action. The potential risk of a class-wide verdict (variance) is often too large for the defendant to bear, so the defendant offloads the risk through settlement. However, the extent to which the certification of a class action exerts such a high level of settlement pressure	  as	  to	  be	  tantamount	  to	  “blackmail”—a charge levied by Judges Easterbrook, Friendly, and Posner—is debatable. See Charles Silver, “We’re	  Scared	  
to	   Death:”	   Class	   Certification	   and	   Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357,	   1359	   (2003)	   (“[Many	  academics and] [e]mpirical researchers . . .	  dispute	  the	  blackmail	  claim.”).	    90  Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 130–60. Some studies indicate that attorneys can mitigate these effects and lead clients to take a more risk-neutral approach to litigation decisions. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New 
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 120 (1997) (using a psychology experiment to support this conclusion). That said, the presence of a contingency fee arrangement on the	   plaintiffs’	   side	   can	   actually	   accentuate	   these	   risk	   preferences	   by	  enabling the lawyer herself to be more risk-seeking on a specific case among a larger portfolio of cases. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Refinancing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 200 (2001) (explaining that law firms give attorneys the flexibility to pursue a combination of both high-payout, high-risk cases and low-risk, stable-payout cases); see also Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful	  or	  Wishful:	  Lawyers’	  Ability	  To	  Predict	  Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 143 (2010) (finding that a majority of lawyers are susceptible to overconfidence).  
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judgment trilogy,91 and they have additional, though less explicit, explanatory power in Twombly. Such concerns also underlie recent court of appeals decisions requiring a putative class to satisfy the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence, even if such an inquiry overlaps with merits-related questions.92 However, with perhaps the limited exception of the emerging trend toward more robust merits-based analysis at the class certification stage, pretrial screening mechanisms like the summary judgment stage and the motion to dismiss stage only eliminate upward-shifting variance by screening out clearly meritless cases. These binary mechanisms are not designed to narrow the potential range of outcomes on surviving claims. Nor are they designed to provide robust merits-based information about those claims, much less at early stages in the litigation, when parties typically seek to manage variance.93 High levels of variance can also, indirectly, incentivize defendants 
to	   make	   strategic	   “zero”	   settlement	   offers,94 perhaps in combination with other strategic behavior vis-à-vis current procedural rules, in order to shift settlement ranges downward for reasons bearing little relationship to the merits. Of course, defendants may make zero offers for a number of reasons.95 But in the face of potentially expansive liability, say, in cases of mass harm or in cases involving high potential 
  91  See Nagareda, supra note	  22,	  at	  651	  (“Viewed	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  our	  scholarly	  vocabulary today, the debates over the various pretrial checkpoints [such as summary judgment] center on what one might label as uncertainty costs [like] variance of outcomes associated with movement to successive stages of the litigation process.”).  92  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“An	   overlap	   between	   a	   class	   certification	   requirement	   and	   the	   merits	   of	   a	   claim	   is	   no	  reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class 
certification	   requirement	   is	  met.”);	   In re Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37 (2d Cir. 2006) (establishing a preponderance of the evidence standard for class certification).  93  Parties tend to manage variance in lawsuits, as they do in finance, ex ante. Rhee, The 
Effect of Risk, supra note 86, at 230 (explaining that parties, by necessity, make decisions ex ante).  94 Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 59, at 343 (explaining that a zero settlement offer is one in which the defendants refuse to make any settlement offer).   95  For instance, zero offers may be attributable to problems of litigation costs and informational asymmetries; a defendant may make such offers in order to proceed to trial, where she seeks vindication. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 591–92 (1997) [hereinafter Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits] (discussing impediments to settlement of litigation over penalties for frivolous suits). An insured defendant, who faces little risk as a practical matter of paying more than its insurance policy limit, may 
rationally	  make	  a	  zero	  offer	  simply	  to	  drive	  down	  the	  payout	  in	  light	  of	  plaintiffs’	  particular	  levels of risk tolerance and resources. See, e.g., Charles Silver et al., Physicians Insurance 
Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9, S10 (2007) (finding that only 1.5% of paid malpractice claims involved payments that exceeded the primary policy limits).  
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damages, defendants may react not by offloading the risk of variance through settlement, but by making zero offers96 for strategic reasons.97 In particular, defendants facing multiple claims for similar harms may 
exploit	  plaintiffs’	   risk	   aversions,	  which	   are	   especially pronounced for those plaintiffs with limited resources, by taking a hard-line approach to settlement.98 Such offers might even be conceptualized as a form of vigilante procedural reform: To the extent pretrial procedural mechanisms insufficiently inform parties about the merits of the underlying claims so as to better narrow the range of potential outcomes, zero offers can be conceptualized as a market response—albeit a normatively undesirable one in cases in which claims are in fact meritorious. 
2. Faint Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Fail To Provide Parties with 
Robust Merits-Related Guidance for Settlement Settlement outcomes that do not meaningfully reflect the merits of the underlying claims are not just the product of factors that are unrelated to the merits of a case and insufficiently mitigated by the Federal Rules. Here I argue that they are also the product of at least three structural features of the Federal Rules themselves. First, pretrial adjudicative determinations under the Federal Rules, by design, produce limited merits-based guidance for settlement decisions. Second, more robust merits-based determinations are deferred until or around the time of trial itself. Third, even those pretrial procedures that provide limited merits-based guidance sometimes fail on their own terms. Each of these structural features contributes to the fading influence of substantive law on settlement outcomes. 
  96  Zero offers are not as rare as early litigation models, such as the Priest-Klein hypothesis, would predict; in 1991, they were found to occur in 25.2% of personal injury cases and in 44% of commercial transaction cases. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 59, at 343.  97  See id. at 343 (noting that zero offers are used for the strategic purposes of inducing dismissal through threatened higher trial costs, dissuading risk-averse plaintiffs from proceeding further with litigation, and discouraging future litigation by different plaintiffs).   98  This was the strategy that Merck employed at the outset of suits brought by various plaintiffs alleging that its drug Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes. See generally Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270–71 & n.12 (2011) (noting that Merck initially insisted that it would take each and every case to 
trial,	  but	  also	  speculating	  that	  “early	  trials	  and	  procedural	  battles	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  fights	  over	  bargaining position for the all-but-inevitable	  mass	   settlement”).	  Merck	   then	   took various cases to trial, using the results as guideposts for a global settlement of Vioxx claims. See 
generally id. at 278–80 (describing how the 2007 Vioxx settlement was reached).  
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a. Pretrial Adjudicative Procedures Generate Limited Merits Guidance Pretrial adjudicative procedures are designed to determine whether claims satisfy a minimum standard of viability sufficient to allow them to move onto the next stage of the litigation. The 1938 reformers designed these mechanisms with the purpose of preventing the expenditure of resources—by litigants or the judicial system—on claims that were so insupportable as not to justify the cost of discovery (motions to dismiss) or trial (summary judgment). This approach makes sense from within the 1938 worldview: When the structural litigation endpoint is resolution through trial, it is sensible for pretrial adjudicative procedures to serve a gatekeeping function in determining whether a given claim should, in fact, proceed to the next step on the path toward trial. Moreover, by design, judges are limited under these rules in their ability to apply law to facts.99 Pretrial adjudicative mechanisms are not designed to give parties guidance, particularly on issues that may be more salient to settlement decisions, and in practice provide only weak signals as to whether the claim is meritorious.100 The limitations of current pretrial adjudicative mechanisms to provide merits-based guidance for settlement can be illustrated by an example: the measure of damages, which clearly has a significant influence on settlement outcomes. The fact that courts are limited to adjudicating the merits of cases in the context of case-dispositive motions at the pretrial stage typically will prevent courts from focusing on legal issues that exert significant influence on settlement decisions but will not resolve the entire dispute. Thus, to the extent the parties disagree on the appropriate legal measure of damages, that issue likely will not be addressed by the court until or just before trial—for example, in resolving a motion in limine to exclude an expert witness 
or	   in	   resolving	   the	   parties’	   dispute	   over	   proposed	   jury	   instructions.	  Moreover, to the extent the parties disagree factually on the amount of 
damages,	  limitations	  on	  courts’	  ability	  to	  resolve	  factual	  disputes	  at	  an	  
  99  That said, scholars have noted that the bright line between questions of law and fact under the Federal Rules is fading. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How 
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72 
(2007)	  (pointing	  out	  that	  the	  “rigid	  division	  between fact and law that [appears] to be built 
into	  the	  Federal	  Rules”	  has	  long	  been	  eroding).	    100  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in 
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 988–94 (1998) [hereinafter Molot, Changes in the Legal 
Profession] (arguing that issue-narrowing is inadequately addressed through summary judgment due to evolving summary judgment standards and institutional obstacles in sifting through issues within a case). 
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early stage hamper their ability to provide the parties with guidance on that settlement-salient but non-dispositive issue. For claims that are not so weak as to be screened out of the system, current pretrial adjudication mechanisms fail to provide meaningful merits-based guidance, instead serving as procedural 
obstacles	  that,	  once	  overcome,	  increase	  the	  parties’	  settlement	  ranges.	  For instance, if a claim survives a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss, both parties will raise settlement estimations.101 Or 
at	   the	   very	   least,	   the	   nonmovant’s	   settlement	   demands	  will	   increase	  following such denials, particularly given the psychological tendency of litigants to try and recoup sunk costs.102 However, these procedures are not designed to distinguish those claims that the nonmovant maintains because of their strength on the merits and those it maintains because they are just strong enough to pass through the relevant procedural tollbooth.103 In short, allowing a claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage shifts the existing settlement range upward but does little to inform the width of that settlement range. b. Robust Merits Evaluation Occurs Too Late in the Litigation Process To Influence Settlement Outcomes Many of the mechanisms designed to generate meaningful merits 
evaluation	  often	  arrive	  too	  late	  to	  enrich	  the	  parties’	  understanding	  of	  the strength of their claims before the case settles. For example, no procedural checkpoint in the Federal Rules situated prior to trial, save perhaps an emerging preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement at the class certification stage,104 permits evaluation of evidence. In fact, 
  101  This will be true more often, in the case of summary judgment, if any impending trial is to be conducted by a judge rather than a jury. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 99 n.116. It will be less true, either for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, if the 
judge’s	  denial	  of a motion signals a likelihood of the movant on various upcoming motions in either the discovery or trial stage of litigation. These signals may become more frequent, and perhaps stronger, in the wake of 2010 amendments to Rule 56, which require judges to explain a denial of a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  102  The	   “sunk	   cost”	   fallacy	   is	   a	   psychological	   phenomenon	   whereby	   individuals incur further losses and/or take substantial risks in order to recoup prior losses. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition To Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: 
Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 789–90	  (1985)	  (describing	  “sunk	  costs”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  stock and mutual fund sale decisions).  103  See Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 992 (discussing, in particular, summary judgment).  104  See, e.g., Wal-Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	  v.	  Dukes,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2541,	  2551	  (2011)	  (“Rule	  23	  does	  not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently	  numerous	  parties,	  common	  questions	  of	  law	  or	  fact,	  etc.”). 
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the summary judgment standard explicitly prohibits such tasks.105 And the most notable mechanism designed in part to provide such information, the summary jury trial,106 has largely disappeared—in part because it was unavailable until too late in the litigation process.107 Consequently, unless parties proceed to trial—a rare, aberrant choice—evidence in a given case tends to be evaluated in light of the substantive law by no one other than the parties themselves. But parties do so often in the face of legal uncertainty108 and under conditions that tend to produce self-serving and frequently disparate assessments of the relevant evidence and law.109 Further, even information regarding the viability of claims for a possible trial is often 
generated	   too	   late	   in	   the	   litigation	   process	   to	   inform	   the	   parties’	  settlement decisions. Summary judgment resolves very few cases,110 and the summary judgment mechanism comes only after the costs of discovery have exerted settlement pressure. c. Pretrial Merits-Screening Procedures Sometimes Fail on Their Own Terms In some instances, pretrial screening mechanisms fail even to 
  105  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility	  determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for 
summary	  judgment	  or	  for	  a	  directed	  verdict.”).	    106  See, e.g., Harvey G. Brown, The Summary Jury Trial: Perspectives of Bench and Bar, 38 HOUS. LAW. 32, 33 (2001) (describing the summary jury trial as a mock trial with a real judge and jury but with a non-binding verdict). Critics, most prominently Judge Posner, have also 
argued	   for	   “hesitation”	   in	   the	   use	   of	   summary	   jury	   trials	   that	   enlarge	   jury	   service.	   See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 386 (1986).  107  The	   summary	   jury	   trial	   is	   “employed	   as	   a	   ‘last	   resort’	   [and]	   most	   effectively	  conducted on the eve of trial after discovery is completed, litigation strategy is fully 
developed,	  and	  other	  settlement	  attempts	  have	  failed.”	  See Brown, supra note 106, at 33. Of course, lawyers can and do conduct	  “mock	  jury”	  trials,	  but	  they	  tend	  to	  do	  so	  just	  before	  a	  case would go to trial.  108  See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal	   Culture,	   Legal	   Strategy,	   and	   the	   Law	   in	   Lawyers’	  
Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1555 (1996) (describing	  the	  dissonance	  between	  “law	  on	  the	  
books”	  and	  the	  more	  simplified	  and	  highly	  socialized	  “law	  in	  lawyers’	  heads”).	    109  While some behavioral studies indicate that attorneys may be less susceptible to self-serving biases than litigants, see for example Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 90, at 137, recent studies demonstrate that attorneys are not as adept at producing objective assessments about the strength of their cases as believed, even when various debiasing techniques are employed. See, e.g., Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 90, at 135–50 (finding that lawyers are susceptible to overconfidence).  110  The summary judgment mechanism is invoked in a fairly small percentage of cases. 
See Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 871 (finding that in roughly twelve percent of cases, at least one summary judgment motion is filed).  
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generate limited signals about the merits of a case. This is because the screening standards are very general and highly discretionary, and in some jurisdictions or for some types of claims, trends in favor of either granting or denying these pretrial dispositive motions have emerged.111 Predictable outcomes weaken even the faint signals generated by these pretrial adjudications for purposes of informing settlement valuation. This is true in the following, albeit reductionist, sense: To the extent settlement values reflect, however roughly, the 
parties’	  estimation	  of	  the	  claimants’	  likelihood	  of	  success	  on	  the	  merits,	  
p,112 a pronounced trend in favor either of granting (or denying) summary judgment motions or motions to dismiss will decrease (or increase) that value p by some percentage that is related not to the merits, but instead to the trend itself. For instance, trends in favor of denials can give claimants a 
summary	   judgment	   or	   a	   motion	   to	   dismiss	   “premium,”	   prior	   to	   and	  with little consideration to the likelihood of success on those motions.113 Conversely, when litigation takes place in jurisdictions or before judges known for frequently granting such motions,114 the strength of the limited merits-related signals is similarly weakened, but settlement values will shift systematically downward, rather than upward. Unless the party disadvantaged by the particular trend is willing to gamble on an expensive, drawn-out, and uncertain appeal (and the paucity of reported appellate opinions suggests that parties may not typically be so able or inclined115), such predictability vitiates 
the	   credibility	   of	   that	   party’s	   threat	   to	   proceed	   successfully	   through	  pretrial adjudicatory stages.116 
  111  This reality is well understood among lawyers and has empirical support. See Charlotte L. Lanvers, Different Federal District Court, Different Disposition: An Empirical 
Comparison of ADA, Title VII Race and Sex, and ADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381,	  382	  (2007)	  (citing	  empirical	  evidence	  demonstrating	  “[d]ifferences in case 
dispositions	  [that]	  appear	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  district	  court	  studied”).	    112  For a more in-depth discussion of the standard economic model used to analyze settlement negotiations, see Rhee, The Effect of Risk, supra note 86, at 201.  113  See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1980 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?] (noting that when judges have a reputation for frequently denying motions for summary judgment, parties will internalize that fact long before the summary judgment stage).  114  See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at 889–90 (noting that judges may over screen cases at the motion to dismiss stage because of docket pressures).  115  See Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1183 
(2010)	   (“Modest	   quantities	   of	   summary	   judgment	   appeals	   suggest that the reported case 
law	  fails	  to	  reflect	  a	  representative	  set	  of	  issues.”).  116  See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1272–80 (describing the effect of 
predictability	   and	   uncertainty	   regarding	   likely	   case	   outcomes	   on	   parties’	   negotiating positions).  
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Further, trends in favor of granting pretrial motions transform what might be acceptable transaction costs—acceptable in the sense that they are directed at generating merits-based information about the case—into costs that simply chill otherwise meritorious claims. 
What	   is	   troubling,	   from	   a	   policy	   perspective,	   is	   not	   just	   the	   trend’s	  shifting of settlement values downward, but also its shifting of claims out of the federal courts completely, which will be more pronounced in areas of the law characterized by typically under-capitalized plaintiffs on the one hand, and repeat-player defendants, motivated to expend resources on that motion disproportionate to the stakes of the case,117 on the other. Predictable trends in the granting or denying of pretrial motions have also emerged with regard to specific types of claims, again with the effect of skewing settlement values in correspondence with those categorical tendencies. For instance, some claims are known for being 
treated	  with	  “kid	  gloves”	  for	  purposes	  of	  summary	  judgment,	  meaning	  that a denial of summary judgment is more likely than it would be in cases involving different types of claims.118 Such trends increase the 
nonmovant’s	   credibility	   to	   succeed	   on	   such	   a	   motion	   without	   a	  corresponding evaluation of the merits of a particular case, thus shifting systematically settlement ranges attendant to those types of claims upward.119 Moreover, if a judge, contrary to that general trend, grants in part the motion for summary judgment, the settlement value of the surviving claims will likely plummet to some degree more significantly than it otherwise would in a jurisdiction not characterized by such a trend because of the merits-based signal. Conversely, empirical studies reveal that for other types of claims—particularly, for instance, employment discrimination and civil rights claims—summary judgments and motions to dismiss are disproportionately granted.120 The effect of such trends will be to shift settlement ranges 
  117  See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 109–10 (describing how repeat-defenders can dissuade future suits by establishing threat credibility through costly pretrial motions in all cases, even when the stakes in particular cases do not warrant them).   118  Such trends have emerged, for example, in the context of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). See, e.g., Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (noting that, 
under	  the	  FELA,	  “the	  test	  of	  a	  jury	  case	  is	  simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the 
injury”).  119  See, e.g., Lanvers, supra note 111, at 398–99 (finding that local preferences for summary judgment impact settlement decisions more than changes to the substantive law do).  120  See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards 
in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239–40 (2011) (reporting that post-Iqbal, employment and housing discrimination claims are being dismissed at accelerated rates); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
December 2012] THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT 131 
 
systematically downward in line with the relevant trend, rather than with the merits of a given case. Such effects, troublingly though unsurprisingly, will be more pronounced the more impecunious the claimants. d. Scarce Trials and Current Pretrial Managerial Judging Practices Do Not Cure These Problems In a world in which the Rules of Civil Procedure that actually generate merits-based guidance often boil down to Rules 12 and 56, a distorted settlement market has emerged. Moreover, two features of the procedural regime to which we might look to right the ship—the few trials that remain and managerial judging through settlement conferences under Rule 16—do not show sufficient promise to remedy these problems. Indeed, they may only further steer the ship off course. As for trials, the vanishing rate of trials means that trial outcomes may not generate sufficient signals to create a well-functioning settlement market. Moreover, empirical research reveals that even those cases that do reach trial tend to be unrepresentative.121 Thus, to the extent the outcomes of these cases succeed in helping to define the settlement market by guiding settlement values, their outcomes may actually distort those values in more typical cases. Moreover, although the modern interpretation of Rule 16 evinces a greater attentiveness by rulemakers to the fact that settlement is the endpoint in most cases,122 empirical research also reveals that the presentation to the parties of the legal strengths and weaknesses of a 
 Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 606 (2010) (finding that constitutional civil rights cases and various labor cases are now more likely to be dismissed by a 12(b)(6) motion than contracts, torts, and other types of cases); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An 
Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 7–8 (Cornell Law Sch. Research Paper, Paper No. 08-222, 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/108 (finding that employment discrimination and civil rights claims were dismissed on summary judgment far more frequently than contract and tort claims); Memorandum from Joe Cecil and George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson 3, 8–9 (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf (making similar findings).  121  See Gross & Syverud, Don’t	  Try, supra note 24, at 4, 6 (finding that the cases that go to trial generally involve a combination of contingent fee arrangements, extensive insurance policies that cover the cost of defending all or some of the potential damages, personal injury claims, and particularly odd facts); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: 
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1395–96, 1399 (noting that claimants who take cases to trial may be unusually interested in obtaining formalized justice).  122  See generally David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of 
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969,	  1984	   (1989)	   (“The	   role	  of	   the	   judge	   .	   .	   .	  was	   to	  keep	  cases moving at a reasonable pace, and to see that cases not be needlessly	  tried.”). 
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given case—long thought to be the hallmark of settlement conferences—plays a surprisingly small role in the sorts of settlement conferences for which Rule 16 calls.123 Nonetheless, judges report that they exert heavy pressure on parties to settle—influence that appears to be motivated by factors unrelated to the merits of the case, including, primarily, the belief that settlement generally is in the 
parties’	   best	   interests;	   secondarily,	   a	   sense	   of	   accomplishment at having settled a case; and thirdly, to some degree, the desire to clear dockets.124 Of course, the introduction of more systematic guidelines for discussing the merits during settlement conferences might improve matters on this score. That said, even if managerial judging techniques under Rule 16 were harnessed for the express purpose of injecting a discussion of the merits into settlement negotiations, such techniques would still occur in a highly discretionary and nontransparent manner.125 Moreover, judges are poorly situated, as an institutional matter, to bring about systematic changes along these lines.126 Indeed, 
and	   particularly	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   injecting	   the	   merits	   into	   parties’	  settlement calculations may call for different procedural rules in different contexts,127 such policy-laden decisions are best made systematically, by the Rules Advisory Committee or Congress, rather than through ad hoc and nontransparent managerial judging. In sum, the state of the world of settlement under our current 
  123  See Robinson, supra note 39, at 126 (reporting that only twenty-three percent of 
general	  jurisdiction	  judges	  claimed	  that	  they	  used	  this	  “technique”	  in	  ninety	  percent	  of	  their	  settlement conferences and that twenty percent of judges reported using it in less than forty percent of their conferences; reporting also that among judges who settle a proportionately higher number of their cases, about a fifth report using this technique more than ninety percent of the time and an approximately equal number report using it less than ten percent of the time). To be clear, Robinson surveyed state judges, not federal judges. Id. at 114–15. Further empirical work regarding various approaches federal court judges apply in settlement conferences is needed. However, the information about state court judges is consistent with the focus of procedural and legislative reforms regarding settlement of federal cases, which have focused on bringing about settlement quickly.  
 124  See Robinson, supra note 39, at 143–46	  (reporting	  that	  judges’	  biggest	  motivation for influencing parties	   to	   settle	   is	   that	   they	   believe	   that	   settlement	   is	   in	   the	   parties’	   best	  interests; that roughly seventy-five percent of all judges are also motivated by a desire to settle hard cases; and that roughly thirty-three percent of general civil judges (as opposed to family law judges) are motivated by a desire to clear crowded dockets in more than half of their cases).  125  See, e.g., Molot, An Old Judicial Role, supra note 43, at 40–41 (noting that managerial judging is not uniform); Resnik, supra note 37, at	  378	  (“Managerial	  judges	  frequently	  work	  beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned 
opinions,	  and	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  appellate	  review.”).  126  See generally Molot, An Old Judicial Role, supra note 43, at 41–43 (noting that 
managerial	  judging	  departs	  from	  the	  “traditional”	  role	  of	  the	  judge).  127  See infra Part III.A.3. 
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procedural regime should give us pause about the extent to which our procedural rules are providing parties with meaningful merits-based information for purposes of guiding settlement decisions. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that settlement negotiations carried out under the current Federal Rules and purportedly conducted in the shadow of the governing law may not be meaningfully influenced by that law. And, as the next subpart will show, the situation could be getting worse: As the shadow that laws cast over case outcomes is growing faint, a new shadow—the shadow of settlement—is emerging. 
B. Eclipsing the Shadow of the Law: Settlements in the Shadow of 
Settlement A different reality of modern litigation threatens to distort settlement outcomes even further. Increasingly, without trial outcomes to guide settlements, parties look to outcomes of prior settlements to guide their judgments about settlement values. This trend of bargaining in the shadow of settlement has only begun to receive attention in the empirical literature. But the trend is an important aspect of the problem facing modern litigation because it tends to amplify the distortions of the settlement market outlined in Part II.A. Prior settlement outcomes, which suffer from all of the distortions detailed above, can now propagate those distortions insofar as they influence future settlement outcomes.128 The notion that settlements cast a meaningful shadow on future case outcomes runs contrary to the conventional account of settlement. Judges, legislators, and scholars have long criticized settlement for its secretive nature.129 Concerns	   about	   settlements’	   secrecy,	   and	   more	  
specifically,	  parties’	  ability	   to	  purchase	   that	  secrecy	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  the public, have led a number of federal district courts to restrict the use of sealed settlement agreements.130 Scholars continue to debate 
  128  Indeed,	   settlement	   outcomes	   may	   even	   influence	   jurors’	   perceptions	   of	   right	   and	  wrong, and perhaps even their verdicts, as exemplified by the few remaining trials in our modern world of litigation. See Depoorter, supra note 7, at 957, 978.  129  See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 41, at 803 (noting that the rise of settlement and 
alternative	  dispute	   resolution	  has	   reduced	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   “public	   processes	  of	   courts,”	  
which	   “contribute	   to	   the	   functioning	   of	   democracies	   and	   give	   meaning	   to	   democratic	  precepts that locate sovereignty in the people, constrain government actors, and insist on 
the	  equality	  of	  treatment	  under	  law”);	  Fromm,	  supra note 42, at 663	  (“[M]ost	   information	  about settlement remains hidden behind confidentiality agreements and sealed court records.”);	   Gross	   &	   Syverud,	   Don’t	   Try, supra note 24, at 4 (describing settlements as 
“invisible”).	   Perhaps the most famous critique of settlement, set forth by Owen Fiss, laments, among other things, that settlement fails to produce public pronouncements of the law. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 1089–90.  130  For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina prohibits the 
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whether such reforms are desirable,131 particularly in specific categories of cases that may warrant some measure of court-sanctioned secrecy.132 Whatever	  one’s	  normative	  view, as a descriptive matter, settlement literature largely accepts that information related to a particular settlement remains in the hands of the parties to the dispute.133 As an empirical matter, however, secret settlements may not be as pervasive as is commonly thought. For instance, a 2010 study reveals that information about settlements is in fact available to legal professionals through a variety of means: sunshine laws; the oral culture of legal communities, enhanced both by increased judicial involvement in promoting settlements and the rise of large law firms, wherein a great deal of sensitive information is shared among large numbers of attorneys; specialized law reporters, which provide settlement information related to certain injuries, jurisdictions, legal fields, or areas of practice; professional interest organizations, such as 
 filing of settlements under seal, D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(E), and the Eastern District of Michigan has adopted a local rule limiting the duration of secret settlement agreements, E.D. MICH. LOCAL R. 5.3. For a survey of federal court local rules addressing sealed records, see ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT app. at B-1 to -27 (2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdf/$file/sealset3.pdf.  131  Compare, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions 
and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1480–82 (2006) (arguing that sunshine laws and other similar reforms may lead to forum shopping or cause parties to leave the system of litigation altogether), with David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret 
Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217,	   1226	   (“[T]here	   are	   no	   legitimate	   interests	   protected	   by	   ‘private’	   secrecy	  agreements	  that	  could	  not	  be	  as	  well	  protected	  by	  court	  orders	  where	  appropriate.”).  132  See Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 67,	   98	   (2000)	   (suggesting	   a	   “presumption	   of	   nondisclosure”	   when	   courts 
consider	  materials	   that	   “have	  not	  been	  used	  at	   trial	  or	  on	  motion	   to	  obtain	  a	   substantive	  
decision,”	  but	  suggesting	  that	  the	  opposite	  presumption	  be	  applied	  when	  cases	  involve	  “the	  
propriety	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  government	  entity”	  or	  when	  the	  materials	  involved	  “have	  been	  presented at trial . . .	   in	   support	   of	   a	   substantive	   determination”);	   Arthur	   R.	   Miller,	  
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 485–86 (1991) [hereinafter Miller, Confidentiality] (noting that	  “public	  access	  may	  be	  important	  when one of the settling litigants is a governmental agency, public entity, or official, when the settlement is a court-approved class settlement, or when there has been some other significant judicial participation in the	  process,”	  but	  concluding	  that	  in	  most	  cases,	  “absent	  special circumstances, a court should honor confidentialities that are bargained-for 
elements	  of	  settlement	  agreements”).  133  See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 114–15 (1986) (noting that settlement deprives the public of information with regard to the state of the law in the form of judicial opinions and precedents); Friedenthal, supra note 132, at 76–77 (noting that parties can conclude private confidentiality agreements or seek protective orders from the court to guarantee the confidentiality of information); Miller, 
Confidentiality, supra note 132, at 486–87 (describing the use of confidentiality orders in settlements).  
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the American Association for Justice; and, less reliably as a matter of representative sampling, mass media coverage.134 According to this 
study,	  “lawyers	  are	  generally	  aware of the trends in settlement awards 
in	   their	   field	  of	  practice”135 and judges are likely aware of settlement trends within their districts.136 Further, a 2004 FJC study, the most systematic conducted to date, revealed that only 0.44% of 288,846 civil cases resulted in sealed settlements.137 The FJC also found that in ninety-seven percent of the cases with sealed settlement agreements, the complaint was not sealed.138 Of course, settlement is by no means a fully transparent process. Many settlement outcomes remain confidential, particularly in cases involving personal injury claims.139 Attorneys still attest anecdotally to the use of confidentiality agreements.140 Empirical data, particularly regarding the extent to which disputes are settled before cases are filed in court, remains incomplete.141 Further, the sources of settlement information are more available to certain parties than to others,142 and even where some settlement information is available, there is often more information that remains unavailable to the public.143 
  134  Depoorter, supra note 7, at 966–70.  135  Id. at 971 n.56.   136  See id. at 973 (noting that a majority of lawyers surveyed believed judges to have such an awareness).   137  REAGAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 3, 5. Nevertheless, additional empirical work on this score is needed. The Federal Judiciary Center (FJC) study, though the most systematic study of settlement confidentiality conducted to date, does not evaluate the percentage of Stipulated Motions of Dismissal, which effectively can conceal settlements from the public eye.  138  Id. at 8.   139  See id. at 3, 5 (noting that of the 1270 cases with sealed settlements evaluated by the FJC, thirty percent were personal injury cases).  140  See, e.g., Fromm, supra note 42, at 676	  (reporting	  one	  defense	  lawyer’s	  statement that 
“[he	   had never] put a settlement together in the past five to six years that [has not 
contained]	  a	  confidentiality	  clause”);	  id. at 676 n.53 (reporting the statement of a labor and 
employment	   lawyer,	   who	   “never	   settles	   a	   private,	   single-person lawsuit without a confidentiality	  clause	  in	  the	  settlement	  agreement”).  141  As Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson of the U.S. District Court for the District of South 
Carolina	  noted,	   “I	  will	   concede	   that	   the	   vast	  majority	  of	   cases	   are	   settled	  openly.	   I	  would	  also contend, however, that the number of sealed settlements is greater than the index 
books	  or	  docket	  sheets	  would	  suggest.”	   Joseph	  F.	  Anderson,	   Jr.,	  Hidden from the Public by 
Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 738 (2004).  142  See Fromm, supra note	  42,	  at	  700	  (“Because	  some	  sources	  of	  settlement	  information are better than others, and because the best source of settlement information—the firsthand knowledge of the repeat player—is available to relatively few persons, each participant in a dispute may have a different quantity and quality of settlement information . . . .”).  143  See id. at	   680	   (“[Because]	   so	  many	   settlements	   are	   confidential,	   published	   sources	  and networks are seriously deficient in the amount of settlement information they generate 
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Nevertheless, the conventional view of settlements as wholly secret obscures the ways in which publicly available information about 
settlements	   increasingly	   impacts	   parties’	   settlement	   decisions.	   This	  
trend	   of	   using	   prior	   settlement	   outcomes	   as	   “precedent”	   is	   likely	   to	  increase as interested parties turn to electronic databases to guide settlement payouts. The insurance industry has taken the lead in creating and using such databases to calculate settlement ranges144—unsurprising, given the heavy influence of insurance coverage in the resolution of disputes.145 The two most widely used programs are (1) Colossus, which is employed primarily to determine settlement ranges for personal injury claims by analyzing medical reports to determine treatment options, pain and suffering, and impairment, and (2) Xactimate, which operates much like Colossus, but which is used to calculate settlement ranges in property damage claims.146 These settlement databases, at least in their current forms, illustrate the potential problems that bargaining in the shadow of settlement creates for aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of underlying claims. First, settlement in the shadow of settlement creates its own distortive informational imbalances. Whereas litigated outcomes are publicly reported, and thus widely available, repeat-player litigants, primarily insurers and their attorneys, have begun to build up a virtual monopoly over the information about unreported settlements. This informational monopoly gives those parties bargaining advantages against less informed litigants, enabling the shift of settlement values downward in favor of the insurer, but for reasons bearing little relationship to the merits of the claims.147 Second, this informational imbalance allows the parties holding 
 
and	  are	  often	  unreliable	  tools	  for	  case	  evaluation	  and	  negotiation.”).  144  There are other electronic sources of settlement information; in particular, some of this information can be found in judgment and verdict databases on legal research sites like Westlaw and LexisNexis. The information in these databases, however, is scattered, limited, and unsystematic.  145  See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in 
Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 280 (2001) (finding a similar trend in personal injury litigation); Baker & Griffith, supra note 53, at 806 (finding that the majority of securities 
claims	   settle	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   defendants’	   directors’	   and	   officers’	   insurance	  coverage); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2006) (reporting similar trends).  146  Whitney R. Mauldin, Good Business/Bad Faith: Why the Insurance Industry Should 
Adopt a Good Faith Model, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 151, 153 (2008).  147  See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 35, at 1386 (discussing the ways in which 
“informational	   disparities	   are	   accentuated”	   by	   confidential	   settlements); Lauren K. Robel, 
The Myth of Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 955 (1989) (arguing that repeat players with first-hand knowledge of the content of unpublished opinions have informational advantages that better position them to prepare their cases). 
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the information to cherry-pick past precedents that favor them, and to do so in ways that are not transparent to the informationally disadvantaged party. The databases used by these software programs for generating settlement valuations have been found to contain selective past-claims-payment histories.148 Notably, they have also 
been	   found	   to	   exclude	   as	   anomalies	   any	   jury	   verdicts	   or	   “high	   end”	  settlement values—but they nevertheless often include zero verdicts.149 As a result, critics have argued that these settlement databases allow insurance companies to negotiate systematically undervalued settlements.150 For these and other reasons, scholars have begun to call for the systematic compilation of settlement information into publicly available databases.151 Development and implementation of such databases may well help diminish the informational advantages that settlement in the shadow of settlement currently grants repeat players. These databases could also add transparency to a settlement market 
  148  But see Dawn R. Bonnett, The Use of Colossus® To Measure the General Damages of a 
Personal Injury Claim Demonstrates Good Faith Claims Handling, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 107, 131–32 (2006) (defending the use of Colossus to determine settlement values on the grounds that it provides for more consistent claims handling).   149  Robert D. Bennett, How To Deal with Colossus, in 2 ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS: MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION, HIGHWAY, AND PREMISES LIABILITY (2005); see also Dougherty v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. C 07-01140 MHP, 2008 
WL	  2563225,	  at	  *3	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  June	  23,	  2008)	  (“The	  settlement	  range	  output	  by	  Colossus	  was	  based solely on pre-litigation settlements . . . . Neither jury verdicts, arbitration awards nor post-litigation settlements	  were	  reflected	  in	  the	  Colossus	  analysis	  of	  settlement	  value.”).  150  See, e.g., David Dietz & Darrell Preston, Home	   Insurers’	   Secret	   Tactics	   Cheat	   Fire	  
Victims, Hike Profits, BLOOMBERG.COM, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aIOpZROwhvNI (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (describing settlement databases as part of a conscious plan by insurers to underpay claimants). As just one example, the Wall Street Journal presented the case of a seventeen-year-old who was severely injured in a car accident caused by a drunk driver. See Jerry Guidera, “Colossus”	  at	  the	  Accident	  Scene:	  Insurers	  Use	  a	  Software	  Program	  
To	  Pay	  Out	  Claims	  for	  Injuries,	  but	  Lawsuits	  Claim	  It’s	  Misused, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at C1. Colossus generated a payout	  of	  $31,588;	  the	  girl’s	  medical	  bills	  alone	  were	  over	  $18,000.	  Id. She and her parents filed two separate suits against Allstate. Id. In the first suit, a Montana jury found for Sullivan in the amount of $105,000; in the second suit, Allstate employees testified that the Colossus database did not include jury verdicts—the company settled four days into trial. Id.  151  For instance, Stephen Yeazell recently advocated for the creation of electronic databases whereby basic information about settlements—including, for instance, the amount of damages claimed, the place suit was filed, and the ultimate settlement amount—would be compiled and made accessible online. See generally Steven C. Yeazell, 
Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits? (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-15, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1161343.	  Similarly,	  Nora	  Engstrom	  has	  suggested	  that	  plaintiffs’	  attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis and seek damages in cases for personal injury or wrongful death should be subject to public disclosure requirements. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 866–68 (2011). 
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that is still in many ways opaque152 and enable potential clients to make more informed attorney-selection decisions.153 But such correctives cannot cure the underlying problem that settlement outcomes themselves remain the product of distortive forces that the Federal Rules fail to mitigate, and in fact at times exacerbate. Thus, there is significant reason to pause before we further catalyze, and ultimately cement, the growing phenomenon of prior settlements serving as precedent154 for the formulation of expected-settlement-value estimations. Indeed, the proliferation of settlement databases—if implemented without sensitivity to the problems identified above and without the initiation of reforms along the lines this Article suggests—would simply bring about the pricing of substantive legal entitlements via the compilation of a set of distorted data points. Accordingly, the emerging 
problem	   of	   “precedent”	   in	   a	  world	   of	   settlement	  may	   be	  worse	   than	  critics of settlement have feared: Perhaps the modern concern about settlement is less that it fails to generate any public precedent and more that it is producing an abundance of bad precedents that fail to reflect in meaningful ways the dictates of the substantive law. In short, settlement may be moving increasingly out of the shadow of the law 
and	   into	   the	   shadow	   of	   itself,	   thereby	   over	   time	   molding	   “legal	  
precedent,”	  or	  what	  is	  generally	  thought	  of	  as	  “law,”	  in	  its	  own	  image. III TOWARD THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT The shift to a world of settlement calls for fundamental procedural reform. As demonstrated in Part II, the current Rules fail to achieve a foundational objective of our civil justice system in a world of settlement: ensuring that case outcomes align with the merits of underlying disputes. In light of that goal, this Part takes steps toward the development of a new procedural regime for a world of settlement. This Part begins by challenging three central assumptions of the current Rules, all of which fail to meaningfully align settlement 
  152  See Yeazell, supra note	  151,	  at	  2	  (“[L]itigants	  and	  their	  lawyers	  price in the dark [and engage] in transactions for civil claims in a state of ignorance we think intolerable in other 
similarly	  important	  markets.”).  153  See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 868–71 (citing analogous examples of disclosure use in medical markets and indicating that individuals in the legal market would make use of disclosed information).  154  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 53, at 786 (stating that when lawyers talk about 
“expected	   trial-value,”	   they	   actually	   mean	   “[t]his	   case	   is	   like	   other	   cases that we have 
settled”);	   Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2681 (pointing out that settlements are affected by past settlements). 
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outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. In so doing, this Part provides a framework for reform. Further, this Part addresses a number of reform proposals by procedure scholars and resituates them conceptually as challenges to these same three assumptions. Viewing these proposals through the lens of the mismatch between the current Rules and settlement offered in Part II, this Part argues that these proposals ought to be refined and expanded to address the specific distortions set forth in Part II, and to contribute to a more systematic redesign of the basic model and operation of the Federal Rules for a world of settlement. It then offers, as examples and for further consideration, new suggestions of the kinds of reforms that would break free from the core assumptions challenged here, and that are directed expressly toward aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. This Part concludes by presenting a new vision of the role of procedure to succeed that of the 1938 reformers. Instead of merely facilitating trial, pretrial procedures should be purposefully directed toward more meaningfully aligning settlement outcomes with the underlying merits. Pretrial procedure should be interdependent with substantive merits adjudication, not merely antecedent to it. In offering this new vision of our system of procedure,155 this Article lays the conceptual groundwork for the Federal Rules of Civil Settlement. 
A. Redesigning Procedure for a World of Settlement by Reconsidering 
Core Assumptions of the Federal Rules The shortcomings of the existing procedural rules, given the fundamental shift from a world of trials to a world of settlement, can be traced to three foundational assumptions underlying the Federal 
  155  To emphasize the need to redesign the Federal Rules for a world of settlement is not to take a position against the desirability of reforms that would move toward making trials once again commonplace. See Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 
1276	   (2009)	   (arguing	   that	   the	   “strictures	  of	  public	   reason”	   imposed	  by	  adjudication—for instance, the confronting of grievances by a judge, the hearing of those grievances from affected parties, and the rendering of a decision based on principle—should be more robustly effectuated in a world of modern litigation). It is rather to acknowledge modern litigation realities and to adopt more modest ambitions for reform in the hope that such reform will be more likely. Although procedure cannot fix everything and no system of procedure will ever be perfect, the world of settlement demands better than our current system provides.	   To	   be	   sure,	   trial	   may	   not	   always	   live	   up	   to	   Fiss’s	   ideals,	   and	   it	   is	  conceivable that the process of settlement can be imbued with some of the elements and values of trial. See Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement 
Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.	   1117,	   1127	   (2009)	   (“The	   divide	   between	   adjudication	   and	  settlement has become increasingly blurry . . . . [E]ven where adjudication and settlement are neatly separable, the divide between them is not so stark as Fiss suggests in terms of the 
values	  they	  serve.”). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Those principles are first, that a regime of plenary discovery will generate case outcomes that accurately reflect the merits of underlying claims; second, that the role of pretrial procedures should be limited to the weeding out of meritless cases; and third, that the Federal Rules should apply generally to all types of claims, and across all types of cases. This section examines each of these outmoded assumptions. It also argues that recent, isolated reform proposals can be better understood as challenges to these assumptions, and therefore as important starting points for addressing the deeper problem that the model of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is ill suited for a world of settlement. Given the problems discussed in Part II, this section suggests ways to refine and expand these proposals. It also sets forth additional reform proposals that break free of these foundational assumptions and are expressly oriented toward aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. 
1. Rethinking the Assumption that Plenary Discovery Aligns Case 
Outcomes with the Merits The Federal Rules were premised on the notion that exhaustive information exchange through a regime of plenary discovery would facilitate the resolution of cases based upon the underlying merits. At one level, this premise seems uncontroversial: A system that generates more information would seem to lead to better results. And that logic may have been vindicated in the relatively straightforward cases typically brought in federal court in 1938.156 Some seventy years after the drafting of those rules, however, the work of the federal courts requires the resolution of far more complex claims arising under a plethora of new substantive statutes, often alleging wrongdoing on a national and even global scale.157 Many of the cases that exist today are of a complexity and scope largely unimagined at the time of the Federal 
Rules’	  enactment. In the context of modern litigation, the notion that more discovery will always promote better merits-based resolution of claims needs to be revisited. As a general matter, current discovery rules are aimed almost exclusively at curing informational asymmetries, but they do so 
  156  See Resnik, supra note 27, at 512–13 (describing the assumption embedded in the Federal Rules that private litigants engaged in monetary disputes would have the resources to process a large volume of information).   157  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 23, at 1214 (citing variance between the United States and Europe both in the nature of particular procedural rules and in levels of reliance upon centralized regulation as factors inhibiting global-scale class actions).  
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in a way that tends not to be sensitive to cost imposition, and they are not deployed in a manner that tries to reduce variance. More specifically, the problem with this principle in a world of settlement has at least two dimensions. First, plenary discovery permits the imposition of high absolute costs, and the desire to avoid these costs drives settlement outcomes independent of the merits of the underlying claims. Although discovery costs are normally perceived as disadvantaging defendants, plenary discovery can often disadvantage plaintiffs by permitting defendants to conceal critical information through cost imposition.158 Second, in the context of complex, multi-faceted claims and issues, plenary discovery has the potential to permit cost imposition without producing, and indeed at the expense of, informational benefits on the substantive issues that would otherwise primarily drive settlement outcomes. Under the current Rules, cost imposition at the discovery stage is justified by the goal of bringing to light information on all claims for use at trial. The current Rules treat all claims and issues that satisfy the gate-keeping standard provided in the motion to dismiss as equal from the standpoint of discovery.159 However, in a world of settlement, certain substantive issues—for instance, those tied to a theory of liability that carries with it significant damages—predictably 
will	  exert	  disproportionate	   influence	  on	  parties’	  settlement	  decisions.	  Discovery on those issues would facilitate merits-based settlements while discovery on other, more tangential issues may simply impose additional absolute costs that add little information about the issues that matter most to settlement values and also may delay (or prevent) parties from unearthing facts relevant to those more critical claims. Thus, in a world of settlement, discovery promotes settlement outcomes that align with the merits to the extent that the cost imposition associated with that discovery is justified by the 
informational	   benefits	   of	   that	   discovery	   to	   the	   parties’	   settlement	  
decisions,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   benefits	   that	   inure	   primarily	   to	   parties’	  trial preparations. Recent discovery reform proposals, such as those suggesting more formalized mechanisms of targeted discovery,160 can be understood conceptually as raising a fundamental challenge to the viability of plenary discovery for purposes of aligning settlement outcomes with 
  158  See supra Part II.A.1.a.  159  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  160  The default of the Federal Rules is not to target discovery, but judges have authority to do so. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii), 16(c)(2)(F), 26(b)(2)(C), 26(c) (detailing methods by which judges may constrain the scope of discovery).  
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the merits. For instance, scholars have suggested that issue-targeted discovery is needed to address asymmetrical cost imposition generated in the plenary discovery process.161 Specifically, it has been proposed that soon after the complaint and answer have been filed, the 
judge	  (with	  the	  parties’	  help)	  should	  identify	  those	  issues	  that	  will	  be	  contested at summary judgment, and then allow discovery to be performed only on them, leaving other potentially contestable issues—like damages—for later discovery if the initial issues survive summary judgment.162 And some district judges, especially in multi-district litigation cases, have employed such techniques in the exercise of their discretion,163 albeit not in uniform ways. Targeted discovery along these lines could reduce the overall costs of discovery164 by eliminating discovery on issues that might be mooted by a successful motion for summary judgment. But these proposals should be refined so that they seek not only to eliminate potentially unnecessary costs but also to focus discovery efforts and their attendant costs more purposefully on issues most crucial to the 
parties’	  settlement	  decisions. An example of a discovery reform that is sensitive to these additional considerations would take the following form: For cases with multiple claims, and potentially multi-faceted claims, a targeted discovery regime would be designed such that those claims capable of generating the most variance (for example, those involving statutory damages multipliers or civil penalties) are investigated and resolved first. This regime would thereby mitigate the effects of variance on settlement decisions by narrowing the range of outcomes through the development of merits-based information on those claims. Indeed, in certain circumstances, targeted discovery on damages issues ought to be conducted first, to the extent those issues exert the brunt of 
influence	   on	   parties’	   settlement	   decisions.	   Alternatively,	   as	   another	  
  161  See Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 1043–45 (arguing for targeted discovery as part of a package of reforms including strengthened summary judgment and fee-shifting provisions); see also Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 95, at 593–96 (arguing that judicial screening combined with targeted discovery is the best method of controlling frivolous litigation).  162  Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 1043–44.  163  See, e.g., Klein v. King, 132 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (entering a court order for targeted, phased, and sequenced discovery); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.422 (2004) (endorsing targeted, phased, and sequenced discovery, but cautioning that the court must be sensitive to the risk that such discovery will be inefficient).  164  See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 16 (1996) (finding that strict discovery cut-offs reduced time to disposition and litigation costs).  
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example, dispositive (or near-dispositive) issues regarding key theories of liability would be investigated first, thus decreasing the overall amount of discovery needed to reach a settlement that reflects in substantial part the dictates of substantive law.165 A targeted discovery regime, properly designed for a world of settlement, would also address another shortcoming of the current system of plenary discovery—namely, the potential for defendants to exploit informational advantages and impose significant costs through voluminous production. Currently, plenary discovery invites full-scale strategic warfare. This model of mutually assured destruction166 enables a great deal of cost imposition and can do more to obscure than to illuminate facts ultimately bearing on the underlying merits of the claims. Therefore, a redesigned discovery regime would seek to reduce the volume of production generally as well as the search costs associated with voluminous production, while also being sensitive to the costs of production born by defendants.167 For example, Rule 34 ought possibly to be reformed to require defendants to organize production by type and origin of material produced, by subject matter, or by relationship to particular issues. Conceptually, these sorts of reforms, whatever the precise form they might ultimately take, would direct the informational advantages inuring to defendants toward illuminating merits-based	   issues.	   This	   would	   transform	   defendants’	  strategic incentives under the regime of plenary discovery from one of foisting immense search costs upon plaintiffs and obscuring the facts most salient to the underlying claims to ones of maintaining organized, easily searchable and retrievable files and of keeping manageable the task of organizing materials produced. 
2. Rethinking the Assumption that the Proper Role of Pretrial 
Adjudicative Mechanisms Is Limited to Screening Out Meritless 
Cases The presumption that the litigation process should (or at least 
  165  This Article leaves for another day needed consideration of whether doctrines regarding evidentiary privileges and work product doctrines, in current form, impede the exchange of information in a manner that would help generate merits-based settlements.   166  See generally John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of 
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989) (applying 
the	  game	  theory	  principles	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence	  to	  parties’	  decisions whether to engage in abusive discovery practices).  167  As a preliminary matter, the Rules Advisory Committee should consider the extent to which it would help, in some instances, to have special masters with expertise in particularized substantive areas guide issue-targeted discovery. This could help informationally disadvantaged claimants craft narrower requests, either in the first instance, or after a limited period of initial discovery on a given issue. 
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does) culminate in the adjudication of cases on the merits at trial, and that pretrial adjudication should be limited to screening out meritless cases, undergirds the 1938 regime of notice pleading, liberal discovery, and summary judgment. As discussed above, under current rules, the resolution of factual disputes and the application of substantive law to the evidence occur at trial, and pretrial adjudicative mechanisms employ standards that provide little guidance about the factual strength of claims.168 This assumption too is unworkable in a world of settlement for two fundamental reasons. First, the minimal merits screening currently provided by pretrial procedures is inadequate to mitigate the effects of the external forces detailed in Part II that can cause settlements to deviate from the dictates of the substantive law. By design, screening mechanisms simply exclude claims from the litigation system altogether. They do little to reduce the level of variance generated by surviving claims, mitigate the costs associated with discovery on surviving claims, or eliminate non-case-dispositive legal uncertainties that bear on settlement decisions. Second, current pretrial rules are inadequate to provide the kind of robust information about the substantive merits that can narrow 
parties’	   disparate	   evaluations	   of	   the	   value	   of	   their	   claims	   and	   guide	  settlement negotiations toward merits-reflective case resolution. In a world dominated by settlement, pretrial rules can no longer be viewed primarily as way-stations on the road to what is now a virtually 
nonexistent	   endpoint.	   Instead,	   if	   parties’	   settlement	   decisions	   are	   to	  reflect in meaningful ways the merits of the underlying claims, pretrial rules must be harnessed (or created, where necessary) to provide parties with more meaningful merits-based guidance for settlement. To address both of these problems, pretrial procedures should be reformed to enable courts to provide more meaningful merits-based guidance for settlement decisions. Moreover, where appropriate, 
courts’	   pretrial	   merits-based guidance should have operational 
consequences	  for	  parties’	  access	  to	  additional	  procedural mechanisms that can distort settlement outcomes. This section illustrates these principles by setting forth for further consideration examples of reforms at the pleading stage and at subsequent stages of the litigation. a. Harnessing Pleading-Stage Procedural Mechanisms To Provide More Robust Merits-Based Guidance The fundamental precept behind notice pleading, introduced in 
  168  See supra Part II.A.2. 
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1938, is simply to provide defendants with notice of claims brought against them. Notice pleading was not designed to provide an opportunity for the evaluation of the strengths or weaknesses of claims. Over time, however, critics of notice pleading expressed concern that this regime allowed meritless cases to proceed to discovery and engender settlements that were based largely, if not exclusively, on distortive effects such as discovery costs and high levels of variance in outcomes. In an attempt to ameliorate these concerns, in 2007 the Supreme Court introduced a more rigorous pleading-stage screen: the plausibility standard.169 While the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  plausibility	  standard	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  the problem of cost imposition as a distortive force on settlement outcomes, the standard is seen to be inadequate from the standpoint of 
this	   Article’s	   focus	   on	   better	   aligning	   settlement	   outcomes with the merits of underlying claims. First, the new plausibility standard is overbroad and may well screen out potentially meritorious cases, because no mechanism exists at the pleading stage for recalibrating informational imbalances that may favor defendants at that stage of litigation. Second, the new standard does nothing to mitigate the potential for claims that survive the motion to dismiss stage to generate the very distortions about which the Court was concerned when it articulated a new pleading standard—namely, the distortions that stem from the costs, and threat of costs, of the open-ended discovery process. This concern about discovery-related distortions creates a vicious feedback loop: It may well exacerbate the first problem with the plausibility pleading standard—that is, it can be applied too broadly to overscreen even meritorious claims—because the concern puts pressure on courts to evaluate the strength of claims regardless of whether plaintiffs could have produced factual information sufficient to support a plausibility analysis at such an early juncture in the litigation process. Instead, the plausibility pleading standard, as part of a properly designed pleading stage of litigation, could be harnessed as a mechanism for guiding settlement decisions. To do so, however, the 
  169  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 559 U.S. 
662	   (2009).	   The	  Court’s	   decisions in these cases issue yet another challenge to the ever-eroding assumption that, under the Federal Rules, there is a bright-line separation between questions of fact and law. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 99, at 72 (describing Twombly as the culmination of a trend in lower courts towards disapproval of a rigid division between fact and law). This challenge was embedded in the Iqbal opinion, wherein the Court noted that 
the	   plaintiff’s	   complaint	   cited	   information	   available	   to	   the	   public	   that	   actually	   disproved	  
plaintiff’s	   claims.	   See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681–82	   (considering	   plaintiff’s	   claims	   of	  
discrimination	  and	  offering	  an	  “obvious	  alternative	  explanation”	  for	  the	  conduct	  described	  in the complaint (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567)). 
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pleading stage at which this plausibility standard operates should be reformed. Fundamentally, the pleading stage should be conceptualized not as a binary switch for screening out claims, but rather as a more flexible mechanism for providing merits-based guidance to parties early in the litigation process. Accordingly, the pleading Rules should be supplemented with mechanisms that would enable courts to perform this merits-based analysis in a factually informed way. Again, recent, isolated procedural reform proposals are better situated as part of the broader enterprise of changing pleading-stage procedures to foster merits-based guidance for settlements. One set of proposals suggests that Rule 12 be supplemented with an analog to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), so as to permit a party facing a motion to dismiss to request discovery in relation to a particular claim or set of claims.170 Under this new mechanism, plaintiffs would be required to show that public information available to them is 
“insufficient,”	   without	   discovery,	   to	   satisfy	   the	   plausibility	   pleading	  standard.171 Another proposal seeks to harness the strategic incentives of the parties themselves in producing the relevant information for a plausibility analysis. Presented specifically with regard to the scienter requirement in securities litigation, Professor Geoffrey Miller proposes that a plaintiff be given the option to file an objection to the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible ground for relief, at 
which	   time	   the	   court’s	   order	   would	   be	   vacated	   and	   litigation	  would	  proceed to discovery.172 However, the defendant could obtain reimbursement for post-dismissal	  attorney’s	  fees	  if	  summary	  judgment	  is later granted.173 As a preliminary matter, these two proposals reflect an understanding of the changed informational architecture of modern litigation at the pleading stage. In particular, these proposals can be understood conceptually as challenging the supposition, embedded in the 1938 regime of notice pleading, that defendants will tend to control key information bearing on the merits of the dispute at the pleading 
  170  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56(d).  171  See Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170, 2206 (2010) (describing such a reform); see also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New 
Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 79 (2010) (proposing mechanisms of pleading-stage discovery analogous to the former Rule 56(f)). A related, but far more limited proposal is that plaintiffs should be fined or subject to a stricter set of penalties under the existing Rule 11 for abject failure to perform a pre-filing investigation of their claims. Bone, Regulation of 
Court Access, supra note 6, at 931–32 & n.243.  172  Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After Tellabs 17–18 (New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 265, 2011), available 
at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/265.  173  Id. 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
December 2012] THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT 147 
 
stage. This assumption is less accurate today. Indeed, scholars have begun to trace a historical shift in informational asymmetries,174 finding that technological and regulatory changes have made relevant factual information more available and have made informal methods of investigation simpler and less expensive.175 In some subsets of cases, then, plaintiffs may be able to provide sufficient factual support for claims without discovery, or at least enough to survive a motion to dismiss even under a plausibility pleading standard.176 Moreover, these proposals are promising steps toward enabling courts to provide, and parties to obtain, meaningful merits-based information at the pleading stage. Furthermore, some mechanism of preliminary discovery at the pleading stage could reduce the extent to which defendants can exploit informational imbalances in motions to dismiss.177 Viewed within the framework of this Article, however, to 
 
 174  See Reardon, supra note 171, at 2171 (describing developments since 1938 that have eased informational asymmetries, including lower search costs due to the internet, the 
related	   ease	   of	   spreading	   and	   difficulty	   of	   containing	   “damning	   information,”	   and	   the	  
emergence	   of	   laws	   and	   regulations	   “forcing	   or	   facilitating	   the	   disclosure of once-private 
information”).  175  Along	  these	  lines,	  Richard	  Epstein	  argues	  that	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Twombly can be better defended with reasoning about changes in informational architecture. See Epstein, 
supra note 99, at 81–82 (viewing Twombly as articulating a preference against discovery when the complaint relies upon public information). Reasonable minds can and do differ as to whether the information available to the public about an alleged antitrust conspiracy in 
Twombly (or about antitrust conspiracies more generally) is sufficient for plaintiffs to satisfy the plausibility standard. See, e.g., Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at 919–20 (noting that in Twombly, the defendants had a great deal of information relevant to potential liability, while the plaintiffs had very little).   176  The internet is of course a big part of this story. Websites provide claimants and attorneys with access to information about potential defendants and alleged wrongdoing; indeed, some of these sites are government-sponsored and specifically designed to do so. 
See, e.g., Filings & Forms, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last updated Feb. 21, 2012) (providing a public interface for viewing corporate SEC filings); RECALLS.GOV, http://www.recalls.gov (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (collecting product recall information from several agencies in a central database). Internet-based background-checks permit users to locate public records of companies or individuals. See, e.g., Pricing, KNOWX, http://www.knowx.com/statmnts/priceinfo.jsp (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). Even social networking sites provide key factual information about relevant claims. See Sean Wajert, 
Informal Discovery Leads to Dismissal in MDL, MASS TORT DEF. (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/02/articles/informal-discovery-leads-to-dismissal-in-mdl/	   (discussing	   a	   case	   in	  which	   “plaintiff’s	   claims	   of	   severe	   disability were refuted by [Facebook] photos . . . that appeared to show plaintiff competing in strenuous high-speed	   powerboat	   races”).	   Furthermore,	   a	   number	  of	   laws	   now	  mandate	   or	   facilitate	  the production of information about investigations and occurrences of wrongdoing. See 
generally Reardon, supra note 171, at 2191–99 (cataloguing laws regulating information disclosure).  177  As another variant of this idea, FED. R. CIV. P. 27 could be revised to permit pre-suit discovery not just for purposes of perpetuating testimony, but also for preliminary investigation of claim viability, proper parties to sue, and the like. Such arrangements have begun to emerge in a few states, most prominently Texas. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202. 
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better harness pleading-stage procedures and to provide parties with merits-based guidance for settlement evaluations, such reforms require further refinement and additional reforms may be needed. To begin, a Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism should be refined to provide judges with more concrete guidance for determining whether pleading-stage discovery is warranted than is afforded by a highly 
discretionary	   “insufficiency”	   standard.	   Of	   course,	   the	   formulation	   of	  such guidance would likely require empirical studies, conducted perhaps by the Rules Advisory Committee (through the FJC) to determine the extent to which certain types of cases are characterized by substantial amounts of information available pre-discovery. Moreover, empirical research is needed to help the Advisory Committee determine, and then articulate in the relevant new rule, 
what	  it	  means	  for	  information	  to	  be	  “available.”	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  to	  be	  
“available,”	   information	   must	   be	   capable	   of	   being	   cost-effectively obtained and presented in a way easily understood by potential claimants.178 Research along these lines would help the Advisory Committee provide judges with a concrete list of factors for determining whether pleading-stage discovery is warranted, thereby cabining unfettered discretion and better assuring that such analysis is not thwarted by 
judges’	  own	  informational	  disadvantages.	  As	  examples,	  the	  committee	  could direct judges toward a presumption in favor of permitting limited pleading-stage discovery in (1) cases involving claims that 
require	   a	   showing	   of	   defendant’s	   mental	   state	   or	   discriminatory	  animus;179 (2) cases involving defendants who are otherwise not subject to significant regulatory disclosure requirements generally;180 (3) cases involving plaintiffs who were denied requests for information under, for instance, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),181 or, relatedly, have waited out to no avail the statutory response deadline for agencies provided in FOIA;182 (4) cases in which publicly available 
  178  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 23, at 1182 (illustrating the advantage public regulators have in compiling and analyzing information in the context of a broad landscape of complex data, such as the consumer financial market); see generally Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, 
Agents, and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 56 (2011) (discussing the need for market agents who can present information to consumers in an understandable way that might generate operational choices).  179  See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 171, at 67 (discussing employment discrimination 
plaintiffs’	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  information).	    180  See Reardon, supra note	  171,	  at	  2203	  (warning	  that	  “plaintiffs	  suing	  firms	  in	  lightly	  
regulated	   industries”	   are	   likely	   to	   face	   the	   greatest	   amount	   of	   informational	   asymmetry	  given the lack of regulatory disclosure requirements).  181  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).  182  See PETE WEITZEL, SUNSHINE IN GOV’T INITIATIVE, FEWER REQUESTS, FEWER RESPONSES, 
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information about the activities alleged is contained in the informational disseminations of defendants themselves, who have a strategic incentive ex ante to present selectively any information about their nature, activities, or operations in public fora; or (5) cases in which plaintiffs do not have access to relevant technological resources for obtaining claim-related factual information. These characteristics would tend to indicate that information relevant to wrongdoing is 
unlikely	  “publicly	  available.” Conversely, factors suggesting that information relevant to wrongdoing is “publicly	   available”	   to	   plaintiffs	   for	   purposes	   of	  plausibility pleading include: (1) whether claims are based upon allegations of activities that are subject to regulatory disclosure requirements;183 (2) whether a case involves claims whose basic factual predicates could be established through online research of publicly available, independently operated sites;184 (3) whether plaintiffs could (but did not) make a request for information under, say, FOIA;185 or (4) whether plaintiffs in a given case have access to relevant technological resources for obtaining claim-related factual information. Analysis of these sorts of factors would of course require the judge to consider the particular characteristics of a given case in applying them (though, of course, not all of these factors would arise in every case), especially given the risk that parties would invoke boilerplate language in motions either seeking to obtain or seeking to prevent pleading-stage discovery. However, such factors would provide for a more bounded and predictable exercise of discretion than is typically found in current rules. More fundamentally, a new procedural rule for limited pleading-stage discovery should not carry with it a rebuttable presumption that plaintiffs in all cases can obtain information sufficient to survive a plausibility analysis without discovery. This point is equally applicable to the potential introduction of a Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism or a 
 MORE DENIALS 2 (2009), available at http://www.sunshineingovernment.org/stats/highlights.pdf (finding that agencies miss the statutory response deadline in a majority of cases).  183  For instance, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act contains a number of provisions that require disclosures by regulated entities. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1403–06 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325) (detailing one form of enhanced public disclosure). Of course, the efficacy of such disclosure provisions	  will	  require	  research	  of	  the	  Act’s	  practical	  effects	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	    184  For a discussion of the sorts of elements that can be supported factually through online research of publicly available websites, see Reardon, supra note 171, at 2188–90.  185  See id. at	   2204	   (“FOIA	   disclosures	   can	   likewise	   reveal	   little-known government 
policies	  and	  provide	  detail	  on	  their	  operation.”). 
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conditional motion to dismiss. Regarding the former, a showing of need for pleading-stage discovery under the currently proposed Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism will impose additional costs upon plaintiffs—costs which may well be justified in some subset of cases, but might be entirely wasteful and potentially distortive of settlements in cases characterized by an informational monopoly on the part of defendants.186  Requiring a showing of need for discovery in all cases creates a presumption insensitive to such distinctions. And for cases in which defendants possess informational advantages relative to the plaintiff and to the judge, this sort of rebuttable presumption would more readily enable defendants to exploit informational asymmetries through complex and selectively informed Twombly motions and 
oppositions	   to	  plaintiffs’	  required	  showing	  under	  the	  new	  Rule	  56(f)-derived mechanism. That strategic exploitation could in turn drive potentially meritorious claims out of the system or force down early settlement values for reasons unrelated to the underlying merits. A rebuttable presumption in the other direction, however, harnesses the strategic incentives of the party almost assuredly in possession of 
information	   relevant	   to	   claimants’	   allegations—the defendant—to make the court and plaintiffs aware of the sources of public information. Similarly, a conditional motion to dismiss may work well when plaintiffs can reasonably be expected, pre-discovery, to have meaningful access to relevant facts; however, for cases characterized by significant informational imbalances—for example, cases involving employment discrimination187—the potential fee-shift may simply chill claiming.188 It	   is	   true,	   as	   Miller	   notes,	   that	   plaintiffs’	   option	   to	   drop	  their case prior to summary judgment to avoid fee-shifting may mitigate such a concern,189 at least in some cases.190 But that just leaves 
  186  For example, informational asymmetries may occur in cases involving wrongdoing that occurred in private and cases involving	   questions	   about	   a	   defendant’s	  mental	   state,	  discriminatory intent, or small or closely-held companies. Id. at 2203.  187  Chilling effects are particularly problematic to the extent that they are pronounced in areas of the law where Congress relies heavily (or exclusively) on private parties for the policing of wrongdoing. See Glover, supra note 23, at 1148–49 (discussing the shifting reliance by Congress on private party litigation for the regulation of employment discrimination).  188  It is not entirely clear whether a fee-shifting mechanism could be introduced by the Rules Advisory Committee under its limited rulemaking power or if Congress must introduce such a regime. This Article does not take up that debate.  189  Miller, supra note 172, at 19.  190  The option	  to	  drop	  one’s	  case	  may	  not	  sufficiently	  mitigate	  this	  concern	  for	  cases	  in	  which claimants are at a significant informational and pecuniary disadvantage. 
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in place the distortive forces associated with the discovery process.191 By postponing a factually informed plausibility analysis until the statistically unlikely summary judgment stage, without additional mechanisms in the discovery process to mitigate either the exploitation of informational asymmetries or the imposition of substantial discovery costs, the conditional motion to dismiss may well leave intact the same sorts of distortive effects on settlement outcomes present in the current regime.192 One way to address these problems would be to provide for a Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism for plausibility pleading—rebuttable presumption and all—only when the judge determines, guided by specific factors articulated by the Advisory Committee in the new rule itself, that plaintiffs can reasonably be expected to access relevant information in the public domain.193 Such a regime would be supplemented, at least in close cases, with a conditional grant of a motion to dismiss with a cost-shifting regime, as well as additional mechanisms designed to provide merits-based guidance throughout the discovery process to mitigate the distortive effects of unfettered discovery.194 Another way to address these problems would be to use a plausibility pleading standard for all claims (which holds promise, appropriately modified, not only to provide parties with more robust merits-related information earlier in the litigation), but to incorporate an additional rebuttable presumption in favor of limited discovery at the pleading stage. Such a reform would harness the strategic incentives of the defendant to produce relevant, publicly available information in opposing pleading-stage discovery, at least in the subset of cases or claims the Rules Advisory Committee determines likely 
  191  See generally supra Part II.A.2.  192  Even if, in light of a fee-shifting threat, parties more robustly analyzed the likelihood of success at summary judgment, such analysis would likely not reliably mitigate these 
effects,	  particularly	  given	  attorneys’	  tendencies	  to	  overestimate	  their	   likelihood	  of	  success	  on the merits. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 90, at 137, 140–41 (presenting empirical data suggesting that lawyers are prone to overconfidence about their cases).  193  There is precedent for limited pleading-stage discovery: Judges often allow targeted discovery before deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. It is unclear whether judges have authority to do so under the Federal Rules when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when faced with heightened pleading standards. Compare In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that narrowly-tailored discovery might be permitted before the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, provided that such discovery is deemed necessary), with In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-0086 SBA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62278, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (stating that there is no authorization in the Federal Rules for pre-dismissal discovery).   194  See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
152 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:nnn 
 
warrant such discovery. As another alternative, particularly for cases in which the rebuttable presumption regarding pleading-stage discovery appropriately favors such discovery, pleading would be a two-stage process. Under this regime, for the subset of cases for which the Advisory Committee has determined that public information regarding wrongdoing is unlikely to be available to would-be plaintiffs, an initial evaluation	  of	  the	  complaint	  would	  be	  made	  under	  the	  “no	  set	  of	  facts”	  standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson.195 After this, limited discovery would be conducted in preparation for a more robust evaluation of 
whether	  plaintiffs	  have	  stated	  a	  “plausible”	  claim	  for relief. The goal of such a reform, like the other possible reforms discussed in this section, would be to harness pleading-stage procedures to enable courts to introduce meaningful merits-based information earlier in the litigation process. b. Creating Post-Pleading-Stage Mechanisms that Provide Meaningful Merits-Based Guidance The presumption that meaningful merits-based analysis should occur only after the conclusion of the discovery process also fails in a world of settlement, in two key respects. First, parties tend to make settlement evaluations after the motion to dismiss and during the discovery process; therefore, if analysis of the merits of claims by 
someone	   other	   than	   the	   parties	   themselves	   is	   to	   influence	   parties’	  settlement decisions, mechanisms for such analysis are needed during that stage of the litigation. Second, the current rules lack mechanisms that would enable courts to manage the impact of external forces on settlement outcomes by tying merits evaluations to access to discovery procedures. Once more, recent reform proposals are better resituated as challenging the continued viability of a foundational assumption of the Federal Rules: the assumption that robust merits analysis should occur at the end of the discovery process. For example, Geoffrey Miller has 
recently	   suggested	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   “preliminary	   judgment”	  mechanism whereby parties could obtain a nonbinding assessment of the merits of the dispute.196 Through a preliminary judgment, the judge would evaluate claims or defenses based on information provided by 
  195  355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). Such a regime implicitly rejects the new—and equally incorrect—foundational premise injected into the Federal Rules by Twombly and Iqbal that, across the entire swath of cases brought in federal court, plaintiffs have access to public information sufficient to support their claims under the heightened standard.   196  Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 165 (2010). 
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the parties, and the judgment would be available at any time upon a 
party’s	   request,	   presuming	   the	   court	   concludes	   that	   the	   materials	  presented are sufficient to make such a provisional assessment.197 Once issued, the judgment	  would	  “convert	   into	  a	   final	   judgment	  after	  
the	   expiration	   of	   a	   reasonable	   period	   of	   time,”	   but	   before	   the	  expiration of that time period, the party against whom the judgment is entered could object, with or without explanation, thus causing the order to be vacated.198 This early-issuing, merits-based assessment would, Miller argues, encourage settlement by better enabling the 
convergence	   of	   parties’	   respective	   expected-value calculations; 
mitigate	   parties’	   tendencies	   to	   hold	   fast	   to	   original	   anchors	   about	  expected values; trigger serious settlement negotiations that are more focused on the issues of the case; help counter nuisance suits; and increase transparency, presuming such judgments would be publicly available.199 
Miller’s	   proposal	   offers	   a	   valuable	   corrective to the outdated presumption that robust merits-based adjudication will enter the lawsuit at the end of the litigation process. And such a reform could dovetail with the new pleading and discovery mechanisms proposed above. However, this proposal does not go far enough. Although a preliminary judgment mechanism would help address 
the	   current	  pretrial	   procedures’	   failure	   to	  provide	  useful	   information	  about the merits of the dispute with any real rigor,200 the proposal does not fully address the other key reason that parties need such merits-based analysis: the distortions of settlement outcomes generated by the access to and use of discovery procedures. To mitigate these distortions and better align settlement outcomes with the merits of disputes, access to and use of pretrial procedures must be tied to merits-based analysis. Put simply, a preliminary judgment mechanism 
must	  generate	  operational	  consequences	  for	  the	  parties’	  use	  of	  pretrial	  procedures. This is the basic intuition behind a recent doctrinal shift in the context of Rule 23, lauded by some procedure scholars201 and decried by others,202 toward greater merits scrutiny at the class 
  197  Id. at 169.  198  Id. at 167–69.  199  Id. at 168, 175–76, 181, 183.  200  See supra Part II.A.1.  201  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1331 (2002) (imploring courts to evaluate the merits of the 
plaintiffs’	   cases	   before	   certifying	   in	   order	   to	   align	   the	   settlement-inducing power of certification with the likelihood of success on the merits); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial 
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 372 (2011) (calling this shift toward merits scrutiny	  a	  “positive	  development”).  202  See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of 
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certification stage.203 This shift has been motivated by the recognition that allocation of a procedural entitlement—the ability to proceed as a class under Rule 23—generates a great deal of variance, and that access to this variance should be granted in correlation with the dictates of governing law in a given dispute. Along these lines, if a preliminary judgment indicates that a 
party’s	  likelihood	  of	  success	  on	  a	  particular	  issue	  is	  low,	  but	  carries	  no	  consequences for the allocation of procedural entitlements—for 
instance,	   if	   that	   judgment	   does	   nothing	   to	   change	   a	   party’s	   ability	   to	  impose significant discovery costs—then the ability of costs to distort settlement outcomes will remain largely unmitigated and will perhaps 
dwarf	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   preliminary	   judgment	   on	   parties’	   settlement	  valuations. Conversely, if a preliminary judgment indicates that a party is likely to succeed on a particular issue, but does nothing, for instance, 
to	   adjust	   the	   opposing	   party’s	   ability	   to	   foist	   substantial	   discovery	  costs through voluminous production, noticing of multiple depositions, or discovery requests on collateral matters, then the preliminary judgment again will have failed to mitigate the effect of that cost imposition on the ultimate settlement. Indeed, without a connection to the dispensation of procedural entitlements, the valuable merits-based data generated by these preliminary judgments risk being outweighed by the ongoing effects of procedural distortions for purposes of settlement valuations. And, as a result, judges would likely have little incentive to invest the time and effort required to provide an early assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the claim. A modified proposal, therefore, could take the following form: A preliminary judgment that is issued after discovery on a discrete issue under a targeted discovery regime should directly inform the allocation of additional discovery entitlements. After the issuance of the preliminary judgment, the judge could permit additional discovery 
 
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323 (2010) (arguing against the practice of merits-based certification because of inconsistencies with legal precedent, infringement upon the right to a jury, and unfounded fear of post-certification discovery costs); Steig D. Olson, “Chipping	  Away”:	  The	  Misguided	  Trend	  Toward	  
Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 939 
(2009)	   (contending	   that	   this	   shift	   “make[s]	   class	   certification	   a	   more	   onerous	   and	   less	  
efficient	  process”).  203  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305,	  316	  (3d	  Cir.	  2008)	  (“An	  overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class 
certification	  requirement	  is	  met.”);	  In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d 
Cir.	  2006)	  (holding	  “that	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  Rule	  23	  requirement	  might	  overlap	  with	  an	  issue	  on	  
the	  merits	  does	  not	  avoid	  the	  court’s	  obligation	  to	  make	  a	  ruling	  [at	  the	  pretrial	  stage]	  as	  to	  whether the requirement is	  met”). 
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on a given issue beyond what was already provided by the targeted discovery phase; however, such additional discovery could carry a cost-shifting mechanism—either against the requesting party (if some higher showing of merits related to the relevant claim is not made after further discovery), or against the producing party (if additional discovery reveals that the producing party had withheld key materials or information). For illustration, consider the following hypotheticals. First, 
assume	  that	  a	  claimant’s	  ultimate	  success	  on	  the	  merits	   turns	   largely	  on one element of a particular claim. Assume further that the claimant has survived the	   defendant’s	   motion	   to	   dismiss.	   Also	   assume	   that	  plenary discovery on all elements of the relevant claim would be costly and that those costs would affect settlement values. Discovery would be initially limited to matters related to the concrete allegations about the crucial element, after which a preliminary judgment would be made. Further discovery would not be permitted unless, on preliminary judgment, some heightened showing of entitlement to relief in line with those allegations or very closely related allegations is made. Or, if no such showing is made at that point, the parties are made subject to cost-shifting if either no additional showing is made (by claimant) or further production reveals that the responding party (usually the defendant) had been withholding information. Now assume, as a second hypothetical, that plaintiffs file a complaint alleging three claims for relief, all of which survive the motion to dismiss stage, either as it currently exists, or under some modified discovery regime at the pleading stage. Assume again that discovery on all three claims would be costly and that those costs would influence settlement values. Also assume, however, that one of the three claims carries with it the potential entitlement to substantial damages relative to the other two claims because, for instance, one of the claims arises under a statute containing treble damages or statutory penalties. Here, pinpoint discovery would be conducted on the high-damages claim alone, after which the judge would issue a preliminary, nonbinding evaluation of the strengths of that claim.204 
  204  Particularly in cases characterized by significant informational imbalances, the timing for the issuance of a preliminary judgment might also prove critical. To the extent the judge is at an informational disadvantage about the facts of the dispute (as can often be the 
case),	  tying	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  preliminary	  judgment	  to	  a	  party’s	  request	  creates	  a	  strategic	  incentive for the informationally advantaged party to obscure damaging facts. That party, perhaps through production to the court of either voluminous or selectively revealed 
information,	   could	   create	   the	   appearance	   that	   “sufficient”	   information	   exists	   for	   the	  rendering of the preliminary judgment. Therefore, the timing for the issuance of a preliminary judgment is more appropriately tied to the end of a discrete discovery phase, which will better ensure that presentation of relevant materials to the judge is provided 
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Such an evaluation would not only help align settlement calculations with the underlying merits and damages entitlements by providing merits-based information and reducing the level of variance in the case, but, crucially, it would also dictate the extent to which further discovery would be permitted. For instance, if the judge determines 
that	   the	   claimants’	   likelihood	  of	   success	   on	   that	   claim	   is	   low,	   further	  discovery on that claim could be permitted, but subject to a cost-shifting mechanism should plaintiff fail to make a further showing of 
the	   claim’s	   merit	   (or	   against	   defendants	   if	   it	   is	   revealed	   that	  information has been withheld). Or, if the judge determines that the 
plaintiffs’	   likelihood of success on the merits of a claim is high, the judge should supervise discovery with a view toward ensuring that plaintiffs have access to additional discovery for purposes of proving that claim. In either case, such judgments would impose limitations on discovery on any additional issues that exert relatively little influence on settlement decisions. These procedural consequences would help further illuminate information most relevant to settlement and reduce the potentially distortive effect of cost imposition on ultimate settlement values. 
3. Rethinking the Assumption that Procedural Rules Should Apply 
Uniformly and Transsubstantively to All Cases The Federal Rules were designed to apply uniformly, meaning that they apply across all federal jurisdictions and to all cases brought in those jurisdictions.205 They were also designed to apply transsubstantively, meaning that they apply to all cases, regardless of the substance of underlying claims.206 I am certainly not the first to challenge the continued viability of these foundational principles, as a general matter.207 To begin, scholars have argued that the 
 through the lens of both parties.   205  Rule	   1	   provides	   that	   “[t]hese	   rules	   govern	   the	   procedure	   in	   all	   civil	   actions	   and	  proceedings	   in	   the	   United	   States	   district	   courts,”	   with	   those	   limited	   classes	   of	   cases	  enumerated in Rule 81 providing the only exceptions. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 81. These foundational principles are generally understood to constrain the rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of 
“General	  Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 541–42 [hereinafter Burbank, Pleading]. Professor Burbank has argued, however, that the Rules Enabling Act does not necessarily command such an interpretation. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934–35 (1988) (questioning whether the legislative history of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act requires transsubstantive rules).  206  See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal 
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) (setting forth the meaning of transsubstantivity).  207  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal 
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716–17 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Of 
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transsubstantive and uniform nature of the Federal Rules is actually a 
bit	   fictitious,	  given	   judges’	  discretion	  in	   the	  application	  of	   those	  rules	  to various cases208 (discretion that has been more formally embodied in changes to the Federal Rules over time).209 Further, as the range of complexity in federal cases has grown, lower federal courts have struggled against the constraints of these principles210 and Congress has enacted tailored rules for certain doctrinal areas.211 In addition, some scholars have challenged these principles directly by proposing substance-specific procedural reforms,212 while others have challenged them more indirectly, through theoretical critiques of unbounded judicial discretion.213 That said, scholars acknowledge that these principles still maintain a strong hold on rulemaking.214 Viewing the principles of transsubstantivity and uniformity through the lens of this Article provides an additional perspective—namely, that they can impede achievement of aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. These principles tend to be insensitive to the fact that different subsets of cases, or subsets of 
 
Rules and Discretion] (basing his argument that strict adherence to procedural transsubstantivity is untenable on the fact that specialized procedural rules and approaches already exist, such as in the case of RICO lawsuits, civil rights litigation, and complex litigation); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2025 (1989) (noting 
the	  emergence	  of	  “procedures	  for	  particular	  types	  of	  cases”).  208  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in 
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 699–700 (1997) (describing transsubstantive procedure as a myth, given the amount of discretion trial judges have); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L. J. 597, 621–22, 644 (2010) (citing jury impaneling and Rule 11 sanctions in illustrating the breadth of procedural discretion granted to judges). But see Marcus, supra note 206, at 378 (arguing that this claim about the relationship between judicial discretion and transsubstantivity sweeps too broadly).  209  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (laying out various procedures that grant judges increased discretion during a case); see also Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the 
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674–88 (2010) (describing rules and legislative enactments that give judges a great deal of case-management discretion).  210  See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 567–90 (2002) 
(describing	  lower	  courts’	  efforts	  to	  forge	  substance-specific pleading requirements).   211  Marcus, supra note 206, at 404–09 (discussing legislatively created and substance-specific procedural reforms).  212  See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 207, at 716–17 (arguing that civil rights cases might need special procedural rules to accommodate their distinctive attributes).  213  See Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 113, at 2006 (arguing that the Rules Advisory Committee is better positioned to determine which types of cases call for which types of procedural rules).   214  See Robert G. Bone, “To	  Encourage	  Settlement”:	  Rule	  68,	  Offers	  of	   Judgment, and the 
History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561,	  1619	  (2008)	  (“The	  idea that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply uniformly to all substantive law claims . . . still has a strong hold on rulemaking	  today.”). 
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claims, will be vulnerable to different settlement-distorting forces and, thus, may call for different procedural mechanisms. Procedural reforms should be attentive to such distinctions and, more importantly, should provide courts with guidance regarding how and 
when to use particular tools. Begin with the principle of uniformity. As one example, to the extent that cases generate substantial levels of variance—as may be true with, say, statutory claims implicating treble damages and penalties—the allocation of procedural entitlements should take into account the potentially distortive effect of that variance. In such instances, settlement pressure will be acute, so limited discovery at the pleading stage would generally be advisable to narrow the width of the potential settlement range and also to ensure that pleading-stage, merits-based evaluation neither underscreens the settlement pressure-generating claims nor overscreens them simply because of their potential to generate variance. Moreover, targeted discovery in cases that carry high levels of variance would ideally begin with discovery related only to the variance-generating claims—as it is those 
claims	  that	  are	  most	   likely	   to	  exert	   influence	  over	  parties’	  settlement	  decisions. As another example, for cases characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries that advantage defendants, either a presumption in favor of limited discovery in conjunction with a plausibility pleading standard or, absent such discovery, a more permissive pleading standard is needed. Moreover, to reduce the number of costly and broad discovery requests made by uninformed plaintiffs in such cases, a targeted discovery plan should focus on unearthing facts, key search terms, and primary custodians of information related to the most critical issues first. For this subset of cases, discovery plans could be organized, to the extent possible, in a graduated fashion such that claimants can develop more specific discovery requests on those claims as they gather more relevant information. And depending on the complexity of the case, cases characterized by significant informational asymmetries should appropriately require defendants to organize produced materials to lead the court and the claimant to key facts (or the absence thereof) and to prevent the imposition of high search costs that would obscure those facts. In addition, for the subset of relatively non-complex cases, which need very little discovery, if any215 (for instance, cases involving simple 
  215  Further empirical work is needed to determine the prevalence of these sorts of cases. One report, provided over ten years ago, indicated that a fair number of cases in federal 
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breach of contract claims or claims arising out of a straightforward automobile accident), current rules permitting broad discovery and reforms aimed at mitigating the distortive effects of factors like cost imposition216 and variance are not just largely unnecessary; they are also strategically exploitable for purposes of rendering claims economically prohibitive or driving settlement outcomes downward (or upward, to the extent they are deployed by a plaintiff). Accordingly, we should bear in mind that palliative rules for the distortive procedural warfare of complex cases may serve as barriers to entry for plaintiffs with low- or medium-value cases and as weapons for resource-advantaged parties in others. Indeed, for these sorts of less complex cases—where the potential for non-merits factors such as cost imposition, variance, and informational asymmetries to distort settlements is also lower—procedural mechanisms should, if anything, be simplified, particularly for cases that arise in areas in which the law is clear. Specifically, simplified or fast-tracked versions of the Federal Rules may well be in order.217 This is particularly true if we seek to include in the system of public litigation—as I believe we should—these	  more	  “ordinary”	  cases.	  
In	   fact,	   for	   these	   “ordinary”	   cases,	   rather	   than	   introduce	   new	   or	  additional procedures, reform efforts should instead be directed at eliminating the advantages enjoyed by repeat players who currently control electronic settlement databases, and toward informational equality by systematically requiring disclosure by both plaintiffs’	   and	  defense attorneys of basic settlement information attendant to these cases. The need for procedural distinctions among cases with vastly different stakes and levels of complexity is not just a matter of ensuring access to justice.218 It is also a matter of bringing into the 
 court did not need discovery, but that in the cases that did have discovery, discovery costs 
accounted	  for	  ninety	  percent	  of	  litigants’	  costs.	  Memorandum	  from	  Judge	  Paul	  V.	  Niemeyer,	  Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999); 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000). However, both the data coverage and findings in that report have been questioned. See, e.g., Miller, From Conley, 
supra note 2, at 58 n.226. That said, given that there likely exists some subset of cases in which plenary discovery is unnecessary, it makes little sense to leave those cases vulnerable to the potential exploitation of discovery practices permitted by the Federal Rules.   216  See supra Part III.A.1.  217  Setting forth details of such potential tracks is the subject of future work, which would build on that of modern procedure thinkers along these lines. See, e.g., Burbank, 
Pleading, supra note 205, at 537–38, 545 (expressing support for the development of separate tracks for cases, depending on their underlying characteristics).  218  Indeed,	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   suspicion	   among	   scholars	   that	   complex,	   “Cadillac”	  procedures are pricing more modest cases involving low- or even medium-value claims out of the system. See Samuel Estreicher, Beyond Cadillacs and Rickshaws: Towards a Culture of 
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system of litigation the public value of precedents, and perhaps, with adequate simplicity in these ordinary cases, the public value of trials, which could serve as informal bellwethers for settlements in more complex cases arising under similar liability theories. Such signals would also produce efficiency gains for the settlement market overall. Beyond the principle of uniformity, different substantive claims warrant different procedural treatment as well. Different types of substantive claims are likely susceptible to different types of distortions, and as such, the problems attendant to the principle of uniformity apply equally to such substantive claims. In other words, abandoning the principle of uniformity will also lead to a weakening of the principle of transsubstantivity.219 More importantly, though, the principle of transsubstantivity is independently problematic because it forecloses consideration—potentially by Congress—of the importance of private enforcement through litigation to the substantive regulatory scheme in striking the appropriate balance between achievement of regulatory goals and mitigation of settlement-distorting forces. For example, some substantive claims—say, complex antitrust claims—systematically tend to require significant discovery and, under a transsubstantive regime, call for procedural mechanisms that stringently police the costs of such discovery. Substantive policy considerations, however, may warrant increased tolerance for the potentially distortive forces of costs or variance with respect to claims like employment discrimination which, as I have discussed in prior work, play an important role in an overall regulatory scheme.220 Where private litigants play a less crucial role in regulating harms, however, procedural mechanisms that mitigate the effects of costs and variance may be more desirable. In other words, procedural reform that rejects the principle of uniformity only gets us so far; in some instances, whether and to what extent to adopt certain reforms could depend on the particular substantive area of the law upon which such reforms would operate. 
 
Citizen Service, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 323, 325–27 (2005).  219  A point of clarification is in order. Consistent with the approach taken by scholars who have proposed substance-specific procedural reforms, it is not my argument that we should adopt entirely separate procedural regimes for every different body of substantive law. This is not a call, for instance, for a return to the common-law writ system. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the 
“One	   Size	   Fits	   All”	   Assumption, 87 DENV. L. REV. 377,	   388	   (2010)	   (“Those	   who	   cherish	  transsubstantive procedure are right that we do not want to return to . . . the writ system . . . .”).  220  See Glover, supra note 23, at 1449 (tracing how Congress relied in large part upon private litigation to enforce employment discrimination laws). 
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As another example, there are certain substantive laws that tend systematically to generate low-value claims, and tend systematically to stem from alleged wrongdoing that occurred on a large scale.221 In such instances, there is a concern that defendants may exploit cost imposition to avoid liability as to any individual case, and thus to avoid liability in the aggregate, unless plaintiffs can bring their claims as a class or unless plaintiffs have access to other mechanisms that make low-value claiming economically viable. As I have explored in more detail in prior work,222 this is arguably the concern underlying recent cases invalidating class action waivers and the broader debate about the use of procedural private ordering to require arbitration and to prohibit the use of the class action device in cases involving these types of low-value claims.223 In these situations, there are two competing sources of settlement distortion: the variance generated by the certification of a class, on the one hand, and the strategic imposition of prohibitive costs through robust motions to dismiss and offensive plenary discovery practices on the other. To the extent that	   defendants’	   exculpation	   from	   liability	   is	  concerning, a number of nontranssubstantive, non-uniform procedural consequences follow. For example, the ability to prohibit the class action by contract—at least without providing adequate additional mechanisms to enable claiming224—should be constrained for certain 
  221  For example, employment discrimination cases often concern low-value claims held by low-wage earners. See generally Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the 
Agency’s	  Role	   in	  Employment	  Discrimination	  Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 32–40 (1996) (noting that the vast majority of race and gender discrimination cases brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission involved low-value claims and often featured low-wage earners as plaintiffs).  222  J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740–47 (2006) (describing how the prevalence of contracts of adhesion provides an increasingly greater opportunity for class action waivers to effectively prohibit low-value claims).  223  See id. at 1761 (describing how class action waivers undermine the central justifications for giving arbitration a favored status).  224  Such	   mechanisms	   began	   appearing	   in	   what	   are	   known	   as	   “third-generation”	  arbitration clauses. For example, AT&T implemented such an arbitration clause in 2006, 
which	  “allocates	  the	  entire	  cost	  of arbitration	  [on	  meritorious	  claims]	   to	  [the	  defendant]”;	  
“permits	  either	  party	   to	  proceed	   in	   small	   claims	   court”;	   “contains	  no . . . limitation on the arbitrator’s	   authority	   to	   award	   punitive	   damages”;	   “provides	   for	   a	   minimum	   award	  
(denominated	  a	  ‘premium’)	  if	  the	  arbitrator	  awards	  the	  customer	  more	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  
[the	   defendant’s]	   last	   settlement	   offer”;	   and	   provides	   that	   the	   defendant	   will	   “pay	   [the	  customer’s]	   attorney,	   if	   any,	   twice	   the	   amount	   of	   attorneys’	   fees,	   and	   reimburse	   any	  
expenses.”	  Brief	  of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 14–16, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976). Such mechanisms come with their own problems, see Glover, supra note 23, at 1166–67, but they are certainly better than the alternative: no mechanisms to enable claiming and no class action device. At the very least, courts should insist that some of these mechanisms be in place in order for 
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subsets of substantive rights that tend to generate low-value claims and for which enforcement by private parties is needed to deter wrongdoing. For instance, this measure might be warranted in cases involving claims like those brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for wage-and-hour violations—claims that are of typically small value for any given individual and that are brought under a statute characterized by significant levels of under-enforcement by the relevant public regulatory body.225 Further, and putting aside for the moment the issue of contractual class action prohibitions, the requirements of Rule 23 may well warrant relaxation in such cases, perhaps after a more robust, factually informed	  analysis	  of	  the	  claims’	  merits prior to that relaxed certification analysis. Conversely, and given the unique ability of class certification to generate high levels of variance for substantive areas of the law not typified by a tendency to generate low-value claims, the strictures of Rule 23 might warrant tightening if a preliminary, factually informed analysis of the merits indicates that the underlying claims are weak. Alternatively, or in addition, class certification could be granted conditionally in such cases, with the ultimate decision about certification dependent upon a further showing, after a limited period of discovery, of a greater likelihood of success on the merits. Indeed, 
such	   reforms	   could	   well	   mitigate	   the	   Court’s	   concerns	   in	   Twombly about permitting access to significant discovery cost imposition and about the high level of variance generated by the certification of a class.226 Such reforms would also address concerns, voiced by 
Twombly’s critics, that defendants likely possessed the information 
relevant	   to	   plaintiffs’	   allegations	   of	   conspiracy	   under	   the	   Sherman	  Act.227 Specifically, as one example, such reforms would have permitted the Twombly plaintiffs to obtain limited preliminary discovery regarding the alleged existence of an agreement by defendants to violate the antitrust laws, while providing a mechanism for more 
robust	   evaluation	   of	   the	   plausibility	   of	   plaintiffs’	   claims	   before	   they	  could obtain class certification and proceed further in the litigation.  To say that the foundational principles of uniformity and 
 contracts containing class waivers to survive an unconscionability analysis.   225  Glover, supra note 23, at 1150–51.  226  As I have explored in prior work, a stricter approach to class certification in cases alleging antitrust conspiracy is less concerning as a matter of overall regulation of such misconduct, given fairly robust public enforcement of antitrust violations. Glover, supra note 23, at 1158–59	   (discussing	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice’s	   amnesty	   program	   for	  whistleblowers reporting Sherman Act violations).   227  See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at 919–20	   (“[T]he defendant [in 
Twombly had] a great deal of information relevant to liability and the plaintiff [had] very little . . . .”). 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
December 2012] THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT 163 
 
transsubstantivity must be revisited is not to advocate that reform should occur primarily through the ad hoc and burdensome case-by-case exercise of judicial discretion. There are a number of architectural challenges to mediating among these various concerns. These challenges are best addressed by the Advisory Committee,228 which can commission broad-based empirical studies, and which can then craft 
procedural	  rules	  that	  channel	  judges’	  discretion	  through	  the	  inclusion	  of as much concrete guidance on these issues as possible. Moreover, in some instances, particularly those in which countervailing distortions exist—for example, claims that generate variance on the one hand but are susceptible to cost exploitation by defendants against plaintiffs with small-value claims on the other—Congress may need to make substantive policy judgments, as it has done before in limited contexts.229 Indeed, Congress is perhaps best positioned to determine whether—as a matter of the enforcement of the underlying substantive law in light of overall regulatory objectives,230 as a matter of access to justice,231 or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   the	  “moral	  weight”	  which	  one	  might attach to certain substantive rights232—it is better to permit a little more variance through, say, class certification, than it is to leave such claims unremedied. Once these first-order determinations are made, judicial discretion regarding the particulars of a given case would proceed more predictably and systematically. All of the potential reforms set forth above necessarily warrant more exhaustive consideration than can be provided here. They are offered here as examples of reforms that should be part of the redesign of current procedural rules for a world of settlement. Further, they lay the groundwork for the development of procedural tools that would break free from the underlying principles of the Federal Rules (which are ill-suited to a world of settlement) would address the factors 
  228  Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 113, at 1963 (arguing that trial judges face serious problems in tailoring case-specific procedures that work well in the highly strategic environment of litigation).   229  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530 n.365 (2008) (citing the Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat. 161 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006))).  230  See Glover, supra note 23, at 1146–52	   (describing	   Congress’s	   position	   in	   assessing	  public and private enforcement mechanisms to obtain its enforcement objectives).   231  See Glover, supra note 222, at 1736–37 (arguing that class action waivers, in certain substantive contexts, may effectively prevent broad swaths of potential plaintiffs from vindicating substantive rights and may effectively enable defendants to avoid liability under certain statutes).  232  See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note	   6,	   at	   914	   (“Many	   people	   assign	  substantial moral weight to constitutionally protected interests, including, and perhaps especially, the interests	  protected	  by	  the	  First	  Amendment.”). 
GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2012 9:26 AM 
164 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:nnn 
 
tending to unmoor those settlements from the merits of underlying disputes, and would direct pretrial procedures more purposefully toward generating merits-based	   information	   relevant	   to	   parties’	  settlement decisions. In short, they pave the way toward procedures designed for a world of settlement. 
B. A New Vision of Procedures Designed for a World of Settlement From the challenges issued above, as well as from the examples of reform proposals situated therein, a new vision for a system of procedure in a world of settlement emerges. At a conceptual level, rethinking the assumptions identified above and moving toward reform require, fundamentally, a redefining of the relationship between procedure—in particular, pretrial procedure—and guidance regarding the substantive merits of a given case. Whereas under the current rules, pretrial procedure is viewed largely as separate from, and antecedent to, robust examination of the merits, in a world of settlement, merits evaluation and pretrial procedure must be both temporally interconnected and operationally interdependent. More specifically, a new system of procedure should harness pretrial procedural mechanisms to provide meaningful merits-based guidance for settlement decisions and to address the distortive effects of external forces on those decisions. Moreover, merits-based guidance 
generated	  through	  pretrial	  procedures	  should	  influence	  parties’	  access	  to procedural mechanisms. In short, procedural reform should foster, rather than merely avoid interfering with, the fundamental goal of our litigation system—to align case outcomes with the dictates of substantive law.233 This new vision has broader implications for the world of modern litigation. First, it calls for a partial retreat from the highly discretionary, nontransparent, and unbounded forms of managerial judging that have dominated the litigation landscape in the past 
  233  At some level, this new vision of procedure requires rethinking the 1938 reformers’	  
“hands	   off”	   procedural	   approach. First,	   this	   “hands	   off”	   approach perpetuates a fiction; scholars have long recognized that procedure significantly impacts the functioning of substantive law. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801,	  802	  (2009)	  (“Procedure	  is	  an	  instrument	  of	  power	  that	  can,	  in	  a	  very	  practical sense, generate	  or	  undermine	  substantive	  rights.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove 30 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-31, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677608. Second, the 
“hands	   off”	   approach	   stands	   as	   an	   impediment	   to	   meaningful	   reform:	   Procedure	   cannot	  simply be viewed as a potential problem; rather, it must also be viewed as part of the solution. 
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decades.234 Procedural reforms along the lines suggested above provide for a more robust adjudicative and transparent role for judges during the pretrial phase of litigation. Moreover, they direct the exercise of judicial discretion under those procedural rules explicitly, 
and	  more	  concretely,	  toward	  guiding	  parties’	  settlement	  decisions	  with	  merits-based considerations. Second, and relatedly, evaluation of the merits prior to settlement, even in a non-case-dispositive setting, would reinvigorate the public dimension of private litigation235 by promoting an increase in judicial pronouncements of the law. Such pronouncements would help resolve existing legal uncertainties and add transparency to a system of litigation dominated by settlement. Further, public pronouncements of 
the	   law	   in	   one	   case	   hold	   promise	   to	   orient	   parties’	   litigation	   and	  settlement decisions around merits-based considerations in future cases. Third, this new vision of procedure calls for institutional commitments to the fundamental precept that our procedural system should aid in the effectuation of substantive law. Introducing more robust pretrial evaluation of case merits may well require additional institutional resources.236 At the same time, there is reason for some optimism that these additional resource demands would be tempered by efficiencies that reform would also create. For example, redesign of the Federal Rules for a world of settlement—and in particular, redesign that includes mechanisms that provide concrete and explicit guidance to judges in performing pretrial tasks—may well redirect the resources currently devoted to managerial tasks. Further, appropriate 
reforms	  would	  help	  narrow	  parties’	  settlement	  ranges	  in	  a	  given	  case	  and therefore promote settlements more quickly, and moreover, could generate merits-based information that would guide parties in future, similar cases—both of which could reduce demands on the judicial 
  234  See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 209, at 720 (describing how the Federal Rules have 
continued	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  a	  “tradition	  of	  discretion”).	  The	  notion	  of	  highly	  discretionary	  judging has deeper roots vis-à-vis	   the	   Federal	   Rules,	   as	   it	   “lay	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   Pound’s	  
jurisprudence.”	  Tidmarsh,	  supra note 1, at 521.  235  See generally Fiss, supra note	   5,	   at	   1085	   (“[The	   job	   of	   the	   judicial	   official	   is	   to]	  explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with 
them.”).  236  Such additional resources could well come in the form of court-annexed arbitrators, mediators, or subject-matter-expert special masters, whose discretion to perform pretrial tasks should ideally be bounded by the reforms set forth herein. Such arrangements give rise to a number of questions regarding, for instance, institutional competence, mechanical operation, and—more broadly—the appropriate theoretical and normative underpinnings of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms more generally. Such questions are for another day. 
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system. Finally, in implementing reforms, Congress and the Advisory Committee should consider whether some of the additional pretrial tasks suggested here, perhaps including the management of targeted discovery, could be entrusted to special masters, magistrate judges, or other judicial officers whose role it would be to aid judges and parties in the pretrial process. This Article poses a foundational challenge to the current design of our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And without doubt, enacting a new set of procedures for a world of settlement will not be without its costs. However, the costs of redesign cannot be considered in a vacuum. Ultimately, any costs of reform must be weighed against the costs of current procedures to parties, judges, and the civil justice system overall—costs that are exceedingly high and frequently distortive of settlement outcomes. Indeed, the merits-related	   “goods”	  generated by current pretrial procedures—specifically, cursory merits-based signals—are frequently dwarfed by the impact of various non-merits factors on settlement outcomes. Given the faint shadow these 
signals	  cast,	   these	  “goods”	  may	  not	  be	  worth	   their	  high	  price.	  Finally,	  the current procedural system comes at a substantial cost to our system of litigation because it fails meaningfully to achieve its own purported foundational goals. These social costs cannot be ignored. Reform is needed to ensure that the content of substantive law, and 
not	   an	   arbitrary	   and	   distorted	   settlement	   “market	   price,”	   orders	  behavior, deters misconduct, and makes victims of wrongdoing whole. The costs associated with careful redesign of our procedural system to better achieve these goals and to meet the demands of a world of settlement may thus be well worth it. CONCLUSION The world of settlement is here to stay, and it is time to face it head-on. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, designed for a bygone world of trials, are increasingly unable to fulfill their animating goal that cases be resolved on their merits, as defined by the governing substantive law. Procedural reform is needed to grapple with the unique difficulties generated by settlement as the dominant form of case resolution in achieving this objective. This Article has laid the groundwork for designing a new procedural regime by challenging foundational assumptions of the Federal Rules that no longer hold in a world of settlement, and by offering reforms that break free from these underlying tenets. It has also presented a new vision for our procedural system that expressly integrates pretrial procedure with meaningful merits-based 
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determinations. In offering this new vision of procedure, this Article seeks both to invite further exploration of avenues of procedural redesign and to guide the way for needed empirical work on such reforms. Meaningful and effective reform will not come quickly or easily, but ultimately, such reform ought to come. 
 
